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THE HAPPY FAMILIES OF TAX LAW*
CARLA SPIVACK**
This Article points to the difference between the treatment of wealthy families
and poor families who apply for tax benefits and argues that the same
treatment should apply to both. I show that tax breaks for the wealthy and
benefits for the poor are both government expenditures that deplete the public
fisc; indeed, some have called tax benefits for the rich “hidden” or “submerged”
forms of welfare. Yet, as I discuss, the law treats wealthy applicants for tax
breaks quite differently from the way it treats poor people applying for similar
benefits. The wealthy receive tax breaks based on assumptions about their
family dynamics, without any inquiry into the dynamics in a particular
family. By contrast, poor people applying for benefits face scrutiny of their
intimate lives, relationships, and spaces to establish eligibility. In essence, this
Article argues that what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I advocate for the same treatment of the recipients of government aid at both
ends of the spectrum. If the poor must open their family lives to scrutiny as the
price for benefits, why shouldn’t the rich? I propose that the law employ a
presumption that families cooperate in maximizing their wealth and require
evidence of disunity to overcome that presumption and prove eligibility for the
tax benefit. For the sake of pragmatism, however, I also suggest a safe harbor:
a modest statutory discount rate for minority interests with no questions asked.
Any applicant seeking a deeper discount would have to show evidence of
serious family dysfunction to overcome the presumption.
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INTRODUCTION
Tolstoy said something about happy and unhappy families being
different.1 Tax law does not acknowledge this. Instead, it hands out tax benefits
in the form of valuation discounts to wealthy families based on the assumption
that these families are all alike.2 The discounts are based on the assumption that
1. The original quote is: “All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its
own way.” LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., 2004)
(1878). I cannot in good conscience add to the stack of law review articles and judicial opinions that
directly quote this famous adage. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 633 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation and the Marginalist Revolution, 71 FLA. L. REV. 455, 492
(2019); Allison Anna Tait, Corporate Family Law, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017); Susan R. Schmeiser,
Romancing the Family, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 327, 336 (2010); William D. Araiza, The Section 5
Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 564 n.187 (2005); Paul
Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PA. ST. L. REV.
105, 187 n.467 (2004). I hope that my allusion takes the trend in new direction.
2. See infra Part II. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform:
Retained-Interest Transfers, Generation-Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 999,
1022–23 (2016) (“Current law allows a person holding a controlling interest to obtain minority-interest
discounts for gift-tax purposes (but not estate-tax purposes) by making separate transfers of minority
interests.”); John F. Coverdale, Of Red Bags and Family Limited Partnerships: Reforming the Estate and
Gift Tax Valuation Rules To Achieve Horizontal Equity, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 239, 240 (2013)
(“Taxpayer B creates an FLP to which she contributes the stock and leaves the interests in the FLP to
her children in her will. Her estate will be granted a marketability discount on grounds that an outsider
buyer would not pay net asset value for interests in the FLP because the lack of a market for those
interests makes them illiquid . . . .”); Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of Disappearing Wealth Revisited:
Using Family Limited Partnerships To Reduce Estate and Gift Tax, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 155, 158 (2004) (“F
and M transfer their interests in the business to an FLP and each takes back a GP interest representing
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all wealthy families are incapable of cooperating to maximize their wealth and
that this disunity lowers the value of minority interests in family-owned assets.
Tax law assumes this despite the fact that it is clearly in these families’ interests
to cooperate and maximize wealth—and, if they cannot, to sell the business at
its full fair market value. They assume away any possibility that family members
will cooperate to maximize the value of their aggregate assets. In short,
valuation discounts assume that all wealthy families are alike, and all
dysfunctional, and gives them enormous tax breaks based on this assumption
without asking for any evidence of actual discord in the individual family at
issue. The government also gives tax and other benefits to poor families but
makes no such assumptions. Instead, it subjects these families to surveillance of
their intimate lives to establish eligibility,3 and it assumes they will always lie
about their family’s situation to receive benefits.4 The wealthy, on the other
hand, escape such surveillance, despite also receiving significant benefits that

0.5% of the FLP’s equity and LP interests representing 49.5% of its equity [to receive] a combined
lack-of-control and lack-of-marketability discount of 30% for the LP interests and a 10% lack-ofmarketability discount for the GP interests . . . .”); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 868 (2001) (noting discounts of partnership interests); William S. Blatt, Minority
Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture of Estate Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 225, 225 (1997) (“In
valuing blocks of corporate stock, courts often permit a minority discount—a reduction in value that
reflects the difficulty of selling shares lacking corporate control.”).
3. See generally Jeffrey L. Vagle, The History, Means, and Effects of Structural Surveillance, 9 NE.
U. L. REV. 103, 133 (2017) (discussing “structural surveillance on poor and minority populations”
associated with “broken windows policing”); Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy
Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1389–90 (2012) (“[The poor] endure a barrage of information-collection
practices that are far more invasive and degrading than those experienced by their wealthier
neighbors”); Khiara M. Bridges, Towards a Theory of State Visibility: Race, Poverty, and Equal Protection,
19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 965, 968 (2010) (“[P]oor, pregnant women must submit to a state-erected
apparatus that requires them to yield personal and, often, private information about themselves in
exchange for a welfare benefit.”); JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE,
RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 54 (2001) (discussing the surveillance of the state’s
welfare recipients and how individuals live in constant fear of having benefits stripped from them
because of minor violations).
4. Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1698 (2019) (book
review) (“[S]tate surveillance concentrates on poor people with an intensity unknown to middle-class
and wealthy Americans.”); Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 542 nn.94 & 95 (1978) (suggesting that privacy only exists
for the wealthy).
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can represent as much as 70% of full value5 and cost taxpayers billions per year
in lost taxes.6 I argue here that what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.7
The literature of tax expenditures makes it clear that tax breaks and direct
payments are both government benefits that deplete the federal fisc.8 The
difference between welfare benefits for the poor and tax benefits for the rich is
mainly that the latter are “hidden” rather than “handed out” directly: tax
benefits for the rich exist in the form of tax breaks that allow the wealthy to
hold onto money that others must pay.9 Yet, these benefits for the rich and
those for the poor rest on two opposing assumptions about families. Wealthy
families claiming valuation discounts are assumed, without investigation into
their particular family dynamics, to deserve these benefits.10 To the contrary,
poor families seeking welfare benefits are assumed to be undeserving and

5. Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It Enforceable, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 759, 766 (2007) (“Common combined minority and marketability valuation discounts often
range from [fifteen] percent to as high as [seventy] percent.”); see also Louis A. Mezzullo, Worksheet 1:
Summary of Discounts and Premiums in Selected Cases, TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO 831-4TH (2007)
(providing summary of the discounts courts have permitted taxpayers).
6. William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture of Estate Taxation, 52
TAX L. REV. 225, 225–26 (1997) (“[M]inority discounts have cost the Treasury billions in lost taxes.”).
7. The original saying, “what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,” refers to gender
equity—what’s good for the wife is good for the husband. See What’s Sauce for the Goose, FREE
DICTIONARY, https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/What%27s+Sauce+for+the+Goose [https://perma
.cc/MH5W-8DEW]. The expression has come to apply to any disparate treatment for similar people
or objects: Justice Breyer once noted that “in the law, what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for
the gander.” Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016). Like the Tolstoy quote above,
this saying has found its place in many law review articles. See, e.g., Michael L. Hopkins, “What Is Sauce
for the Gander Is Sauce for the Goose:” Enforcing Child Support on Former Same-Sex Partners Who Create a
Child Through Artificial Insemination, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 219, 219 (2006); Howard M.
Zaritsky, Sauce for the Goose? IRS Rejects Discount Based on Aggregating Separate Gifts, 24 EST. PLAN. 344,
344 (1997); Joseph S. Jackson, Sauce for the Goose: Some Thoughts on Gay Sex and Equal Protection, 48
FLA. L. REV. 473, 473 (1996).
8. Wendy A. Bach, Poor Support/Rich Support: (Re)viewing the American Social Welfare State, 20
FLA. TAX REV. 495, 498 (2017) (“[Efforts] to redefine the U.S. social welfare state . . . include not
only traditional benefit programs (for example, welfare and Social Security) but also a variety of tax
benefits that are ‘hidden’ or ‘submerged’ forms of ‘Welfare for the Wealthy.’”); SUZANNE METTLER,
THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 16–17 (2011); CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Ira Katznelson, Martin Shefter &
Theda Skocpol eds., 1997) [hereinafter HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE] (discussing
“hidden” tax benefits for the wealthy).
9. See CHRISTOPHER G. FARICY, WELFARE FOR THE WEALTHY: PARTIES, SOCIAL
SPENDING, AND INEQUALITY IN THE US 5 (2015); METTLER, supra note 8, at 16–17; HOWARD, THE
HIDDEN WELFARE STATE, supra note 8, at 3; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the
Delivery of Welfare Benefits, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 272 (2009) (“[P]lacing general welfare (child tax
credits, home mortgage deductions, and education credits) within the tax system frames them so
positively that they all but disappear from consciousness.”).
10. See discussion infra Section III.C.1.
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dishonest.11 While there is no investigation of the family dynamics of wealthy
families, poor families are subjected to intimate surveillance of their lives,
relationships, and personal space. This surveillance of welfare applicants has
drawn considerable—and justified—fire.12 This Article aims in the opposite
direction. I propose that wealthy applicants for tax breaks based on family
dynamics should face the same scrutiny that welfare beneficiaries face to
determine their eligibility.
Because families are different, both sets of assumptions are true for some
families and not for others. Some families cooperate; some do not. Some may
misrepresent their circumstances to receive benefits, and some do not. But,
today, thanks to an army of family wealth preservation advisors, assumptions of
a high-wealth family’s lack of cooperation are often wrong. Happy and unhappy
families—for valuation purposes at least—are, it turns out, different. And highwealth families today hire consultants to teach them to be happy—or, at least,
to cooperate to maximize growth. Despite the new science of family cooperation
for wealth maximization, these families still receive valuation discounts based
on the assumption that they are all incapable of working together for aggregate
gain.
At the other end of the spectrum, statistics show that only a very small
percentage of people applying for government relief actually lie about meeting
eligibility requirements.13 Thus, not only are these two forms of government
benefits—tax breaks and welfare (here I will be discussing the Earned Income
Tax Credit, or “EITC,” and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, or
“TANF”)—operated under different standards for these two groups, the
standards miss their intended target—people whose family circumstances fail
to merit the benefit sought—at both ends.
Many high-wealth families break this uncooperative paradigm. Some
simply do not have family structure or dynamics that lead to division. For
11. See Peter B. Edelman, Criminalization of Poverty: Much More to Do, 69 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 114,
114 (2020) (“Criminalization of poverty, a junior sibling to mass incarceration, is wreaking
havoc . . . .”); Sarah Geraghty, Keynote Remarks: How the Criminalization of Poverty Has Become
Normalized in American Culture and Why You Should Care, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 195 (2016)
(“[C]riminalization of poverty has become normalized in American culture . . . .”); Kaaryn Gustafson,
Criminal Law: The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 643 (2009)
[hereinafter Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty] (“This Article maps the criminalization of
welfare.”). See generally KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011) [hereinafter GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE]
(providing a detailed and extensive description of how welfare programs are characterized by
assumptions of criminality among recipients).
12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
13. See RANDY ALISON AUSSENBERG, ERRORS AND FRAUD IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP) 11–12 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45147.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39GL-LD3D]; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS GOVERNMENT
BENEFITS FRAUD STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 1 (2020).

100 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2022)

606

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

example, an only child has no one to feud with, and succession from one
generation to the next may well go smoothly. Some just get along better than
others. Today, an army of wealth preservation advisors deploys an arsenal of
techniques to avoid leaving this to chance.14 This arsenal includes: family
constitutions, laws of governance tailored to each family’s wealth preservation
needs, articulation of “family values” to guide family decision-making and to
resolve disputes, and therapists—from the legion of “family systems” advisors—
who specialize in keeping business-owning families harmonious so their wealth
can stay in the family.15 Not all families reap the benefits of this advising, of
course. Certainly, the Tax Code’s paradigm of the uncooperative family that
disadvantages minority shareholders sometimes reflects reality, and shareholder
oppression happens. But this has never been true across the board, and is today,
I argue here, even less likely. Thus, tax law should distinguish between happy
and unhappy families. Not only does this better reflect reality, but it is only fair
to require the same showing of eligibility from wealthy families for government
benefits as from poor families.
This discrepant scrutiny of the poor has a long history in Anglo-American
culture.16 The Elizabethan Poor Laws created a system of “Overseers of the
Poor” to separate the “deserving poor” from those deemed merely lazy.17

14. See Allison Anna Tait, The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 ALA. L. REV. 981, 994
(2020) [hereinafter Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism] (discussing the role of wealth preservation
advisors in helping families become self-governing entities in autonomous legal worlds). For a classic
book within the wealth-preservation genre, see generally JAMES E. HUGHES JR., FAMILY WEALTH—
KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY: HOW FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN,
INTELLECTUAL, AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS (2004).
15. Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 984 n.7; see also HUGHES, supra note 14, at
4 (summarizing various wealth preservation strategies and instruments); Brian Groom, The Rise of the
Family Business Constitution, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5d06ec9e-c61b11e7-b30e-a7c1 c7c13aab [https://perma.cc/5HY5-92GE] (remarking on the usefulness of the family
constitution when the family wishes to preserve wealth for multiple generations).
16. See Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 11, at 658–61; see also JILL
QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 15
(1994). See generally KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING
THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA’S POOR 35 (2001) (using the term welfare racism to describe
“the various forms and manifestations of racism associated with means-tested programs of public
assistance for poor families”).
17. Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family
Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457, 468 (1988); Khiara M.
Bridges, The Deserving Poor, the Undeserving Poor, and Class-Based Affirmative Action, 66 EMORY L.J.
1049, 1053 (2017) (“[P]rograms that are imagined to benefit the deserving poor enjoy political support,
and programs that are imagined to benefit the undeserving poor do not.”); Casey Garth Jarvis,
Homelessness: Critical Solutions to a Dire Problem; Escaping Punitive Approaches by Using a Human Rights
Foundation in the Construction and Enactment of Comprehensive Legislation, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 414
(2008).
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Colonial America employed this same system.18 In America in the 1800s, the
poor labored in poorhouses under the eyes of their “keepers.”19 More
benevolently motivated, Henry Mayhew’s exhaustive eighteen-volume work,
London Labor and the London Poor, published between 1850–1862, chronicled in
meticulous—and at times tedious—detail every category of working Londoners,
transcribing their own words describing their work and lives.20 Mayhew’s work
foreshadowed the study of poor people’s lives in the twentieth century by
sociologists, anthropologists, statisticians, economists, and public health
specialists, to name a few, and their scrutiny by courts and welfare agencies. As
one website puts it, “the powerful have long agreed: poor and working people
must be watched.”21
By contrast, scrutiny of the lives of the rich is sparse.22 No government
agency scrutinizes their family dynamics, child-rearing practices, household
members, substance abuse, or work habits. But, as one author notes, it is
important to understand the rich because of their “immense influence” and their
growing numbers (an increase of 10% per year).23 It is also important to focus
on the rich because us taxpayers subsidize them with enormous tax breaks based
on assumptions about their lives that may often be wrong. I focus here on a
particular form of tax subsidy—discount valuations—although my argument
has wider application. If the poor must submit to intimate scrutiny to receive
benefits, so should the wealthy.
Part I reviews the history of the discount valuation, dispelling any notion
that it emerged as a response to the loss of family businesses through estate
taxes and a clamor for salvation. Rather, this part will show that the process has
been the reverse: the Tax Code provisions dealing with discounts arose as a
response to attempts by the wealthy to use the Family Limited Partnership
(“FLP”) form to reduce taxes on the transfer of their estates. I also survey the
criticism these rules have received.
18. See WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF
SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 18 (6th ed. 1999) (describing Elizabethan Poor Laws and how they
applied to the colonies).
19. See id. at 57–61 (explaining the conditions of poorhouses); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE
SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 27–28 (10th ed.
1996) (describing the relationship between poorhouse residents and keepers).
20. HENRY MAYHEW, LONDON LABOUR AND THE LONDON POOR: A CYCLOPAEDIA OF THE
CONDITION OF THOSE THAT WILL WORK, THOSE THAT CANNOT WORK, AND THOSE THAT
WILL NOT WORK 465–66 (1861). Most lawyers are familiar with at least one of Mayhew’s subjects:
Jo, the crossing sweeper, in Charles Dickens’s Bleak House, was typical of the characters Mayhew
studied. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 160–65 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1853).
21. The Color of Surveillance: Monitoring of Poor and Working People, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. &
TECH. (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/events/color-ofsurveillance-2019/ [http://perma.cc/ZR7F-ADUP].
22. JUSTIN FARRELL, BILLIONAIRE WILDERNESS: THE ULTRA-WEALTHY AND THE
REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN WEST 19–20 (2020).
23. Id. at 18, 33.
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Parts II and III turn to the families themselves and the wealth preservation
industry that has grown up around them. There, I chronicle the most fractious
families in the history of family-owned companies. I do so to show two things.
First, family discord that reaches the level of elevating personal enmity over
wealth preservation is easy to spot. Second, conflict in families emerges at
predictable stress points, and wealth preservation advisors target precisely these
points in family life cycles to forestall disunity and conflict. It’s impossible to
say, of course, whether such advising would have saved Anheuser Busch,
Vanderbilt, Seagram’s, and the others I discuss from their downfalls. But having
learned how, when, and why families splinter, the wealth preservation industry
teaches its clients how to navigate past these challenges.
Part IV invokes the tax expenditure literature to show that “tax breaks”
such as valuation discounts and welfare for the poor are two forms of
government spending. I document the scrutiny and surveillance poor families
must accept to receive aid, and I assert that investigating the family dynamics
of rich families applying for tax discounts is merely equitable.
Part V offers a solution. First, I discuss the 2016 proposed regulations that
the Trump administration disingenuously touted as a step in the right direction.
These proposed regulations would have, in essence, applied family attribution
rules to certain currently discounted transfers in FLPs. I argue, however, that
truly equitable reform would go further, requiring wealthy families to prove
their eligibility for discounts. In the spirit of practicality and presidential
dealmaking, however, I propose a compromise: a fixed and limited tax break
without family investigation. Only families that insisted on deeper discounts
than the “no questions asked” discount would need to prove their eligibility.
I. THE LAW AND LOGIC OF DISCOUNTS
The story of valuation discount is the story of a tug-of-war between the
Treasury and the Estate Planning Bar. Estate planners push by devising a new
form of asset structure to reduce taxes; the Treasury pulls back by attempting
to tax the full value of the estates of the wealthy passing at death; the wealthy
and their planners pull back by devising a way to remove value from the estate;
the Treasury responds with a new rule pulling the value back in; and the backand-forth continues.24

24. See Robert G. Alexander & Dallas E. Klemmer, Creative Wealth Planning with Grantor Trusts,
Family Limited Partnerships, and Family Limited Liability Companies, 2 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J.
307, 312–14 (2010) (explaining estate planning issues caused by changes to wealth transfer tax laws);
James R. Hines, Jr., Taxing Inheritance, Taxing Estates, 63 TAX L. REV. 189, 203 (2009) (describing how
the generation-skipping transfer tax was introduced as a reaction to the prevailing estate tax avoidance
technique at the time). See generally Gans & Soled, supra note 5 (describing the historic role of the gift
tax, taxpayer strategies to circumvent the gift tax, and recommending reforms).
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How Discounts Work

Valuation discounts operate to reduce the value of a decedent’s estate to
reduce the tax levied on that estate, or to reduce the value of a gift to reduce
the corresponding gift tax levied. Under the current rules, when a shareholder
in an FLP or a trust transfers shares to her children and retains only a minority
interest—anything less than 50%—the amount of the estate for tax purposes,
under the current rules, is drastically reduced from what would have been its
fair market value.25 In other words, a 40% interest in the business is not valued
as 40% of the value of the business; it is valued at significantly less. This is
because the law assumes that a minority shareholder in a family business or trust
will suffer from her lack of control and will have nowhere to sell her shares
should she wish to exit.26 In shareholder terms, these discounts assume a
minority shareholder in a family business will face “shareholder oppression” in
the form of “freeze outs” (exclusion from decision making and control) and/or
“squeeze outs” (denial of fair share of pay or dividends by majority members)—
and that her shares are thus worth less than their fair market value. FLPs can
hold either passive assets, such as stock portfolios, or active assets in the form
of going businesses. In the former case, a shareholder’s minority status might
threaten her fair receipt of distributions or exclude her from decisions about
management of the trust’s assets. In the latter case, minority status might
endanger her role in management, her salary as an employee, or her dividends.
The law discounts the value of the shares based on the assumption that these
scenarios are likely. Thus, the estate of the taxpayer who carves up a business
and transfers the shares in minority form pays much less in taxes than it would
otherwise.
The plaintiff in the valuation case Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner27
explained the rationale of disappearing value:
Value does appear and disappear frequently in ordinary transactions. If
that is not apparent, only some thought is needed to make it so. Suppose
A, B, and C contribute $100 each to form a corporation, each receiving
one share. With only one share, none of them alone can force a
liquidation so as to get his $100 back. Under the willing buyer-seller test,
what is the value of A’s share? The value has decreased from the $100
contributed to something much smaller, perhaps $45, that reflects the
25. See James R. Hamill & Donald W. Stout, Valuation Discounts for Intrafamily Transfers, 59
TAX’N FOR ACCT. 75, 75–76 (1997) (describing how FLPs create valuation discounts); see also Martin
A. Goldberg & Cynthia M. Kruth, New Life for Valuation Discounts in Family Entities, 16 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 48, 49–52 (2002) (explaining FLP valuation discounts where transferors retain a minority
interest and discussing relevant IRS rules and case law).
26. Hamill & Stout, supra note 25, at 76–77 (explaining lack-of-control and lack-of-marketability
discounts in FLPs).
27. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987).
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loss of a right to liquidate. Where did the lost $55 go? It did not go to B
or C, for each of them has suffered the same $55 loss. Such a loss may
continue indefinitely as the corporation does business. We can see that
readily by noting that the stocks of hundreds of corporations sell on
exchanges at substantially below liquidation values.28
In a nutshell, then, a transferor can reduce the value of assets, and thus the taxes
computed for them, by the simple expedient of placing them all in an FLP and
then distributing minority shares of the partnership to several transferees so
that no one recipient has control—or by retaining only a minority interest in
her estate at death.29
B.

History: The Tug-of-War Between the IRS and Estate Planners and Their
Clients

Although their partisans like to trot out the struggling farmer who just
wants to pass on the family farm to his children,30 the actual history of

28. S. Stacy Eastland, Family Limited Partnerships: Transfer Tax Benefits, PROB. & PROP., July–
Aug. 1993, at 59, 60 (exploring a § 2036 case).
29. See generally, e.g., Michael D. Mulligan & Angela F. Braly, Family Limited Partnerships Can
Create Discounts, 21 EST. PLAN. 195 (1994) (explaining how FLPs can create valuation discounts for
lack of marketability and minority interest); Timothy C. Polacek & Richard A. Lehn, Tax Court Allows
Sizable Fractional Interest Discounts, 133 TR. & ESTS. 29 (1994) (analyzing a case in which a tax court
allowed discounts for minority interest and lack of marketability where a taxpayer transferred property
interests via a partnership); Louis S. Harrison, Special Valuation Rules of Chapter 14 and Partnerships Can
Save Transfer Taxes, 11 J. P’SHIP TAX’N 239 (1994) (explaining how partnership can lead to significant
estate and gift tax savings); Kathryn G. Henkel & Elizabeth R. Turner, Family Limited Partnerships Can
Play a Major Role in Asset Protection Planning, 11 J. P’SHIP TAX’N 216 (1994) (“[G]ifts and bequests of
partnership interests can be eligible for minority interest and lack of marketability discounts for transfer
tax purposes . . . .”); Martin D. Begleiter, Estate Planning in the Nineties: Friday the Thirteenth Chapter
14: Jason Goes to Washington—Part I, 81 KY. L.J. 535, 571–72 (1992–1993) (explaining how a minority
discount is calculated); Robert B. Coplan & David H. Gerson, Estate Freeze Transactions Not Covered
by Chapter 14, 23 TAX ADVISER 32, 32–33 (1992) (explaining how partnerships can be used to minimize
gift tax value of stocks); S. Stacy Eastland, Business Valuation Issues, Including Analysis of Selected Parts of
IRC Section 2701 and IRC Section 2704, C743 A.L.I-A.B.A. PLAN. TECHS. FOR LARGE ESTATES 327
(1992) (explaining how partnerships can be set up to reduce the value of, and taxes on, assets); Larry
W. Gibbs, A Family Limited Partnership as the Centerpiece of an Estate Plan, 131 TR. & ESTS. 45, 47–50
(1992) (describing how FLPs can reduce the fair market value of assets); James R. Hitchner & Kevin
J. Rudd, The Use of Discounts in Estate and Gift Tax Valuations, 131 TR. & ESTS. 49 (1992) (describing
estate and gift tax valuation and available discounts); Rick J. Taylor, Discount Partnership Arrangements
Still Can Be Used To Reduce Transfer Taxes, 23 TAX ADVISER 382, 383–84 (1992) (explaining how
partnerships can be used to reduce the value of senior family members’ interests in a family
partnership); Richard L. Dees, The Slaying of Frankenstein’s Monster: The Repeal and Replacement of
Section 2036(c), 69 TAXES 151 (1991) (explaining how valuation and discount rates are calculated).
30. David Cay Johnston, Opinion, No, the Estate Tax Isn’t Destroying Family Farms: The Latest
Pitch for an Estate-Tax Repeal Repeats a Long-Discredited Lie, AL JAZEERA AM. (Mar. 27, 2015, 2:00
AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/the-estate-tax-isnt-destroying-family-farms.html
[https://perma.cc/GM73-JGU7].
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discounts31 is far from that of hardworking farm families disinherited by the
ravages of the estate tax.
FLPs can serve many nontax purposes in family business planning: they
allow pass-though taxation for income32 and can protect at least some family
members from liability.33 But family wealth planners in the 1970s and 1980s
began using FLPs to fractionate interests and argue for valuation discounts
based on the limited control and marketability of these noncontrolling interests,
and the FLP literature suggests that this is their main purpose today.34 Courts
often went along with these strategies, and, as noted above, an “impressive
string of victories by taxpayers in valuation cases . . . led to a predictable
increase in interest among taxpayers and their advisors concerning the valuation
discounting benefits of family-owned entities in general and FLPs in
particular.”35
The law requires no evidence to support the implicit claim of family
disunity underlying discounts, nor does it allow for its rebuttal as a
presumption. Not all families cooperate. Siblings bicker, and children resent
parental authority. Shareholder oppression is real. But the existing discount
regime ignores the possibility that a family might work together, treat
shareholders fairly, keep the business in the family and maximize growth—or
sell it later for fair market value.36 In fact, the law ignores the obvious: it is in
the family’s best interest to cooperate and, if they truly cannot, then it is in their
self-interest to sell the business as a whole to maximize the sales price.
Other Tax Code provisions recognize that family members cooperate to
manage assets. The family attribution rules of § 318, for example, attribute stock
ownership of close family members (spouses, children, and grandchildren) to

31. For a general discussion of valuation discounts in the estate tax context, see generally 15
MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59:7 (Edward J. Smith ed., 2021); Wendy C.
Gerzog, Actuarial Tables Versus Factually Based Estate Tax Valuation: Ithaca Trust Revisited, 38 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 745 (2004); Joshua S. Rubenstein, Valuation, Taxation & Planning Techniques for
Sophisticated Estates: Recent Developments, in VALUATION, TAXATION & PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR
SOPHISTICATED ESTATES 7, 22–27, 32–37 (Practising L. Inst., Tax L. & Est. Plan. Series, Est. Plan.
& Admin., Course, Handbook Series No. D-322, 2003).
32. Hamill & Stout, supra note 25, at 80–81.
33. Id. at 81.
34. Coverdale, supra note 2, at 242 n.21 (“The emphasis on tax savings of the many articles touting
family limited partnerships also strongly suggests that it is a rare case in which non-tax motives are
anywhere near as important as reducing estate and gift taxes.” (citing Courtney Lieb, The IRS Wages
War on the Family Limited Partnership: How To Establish a Family Limited Partnership That Will Withstand
Attack, 71 UMKC L. REV. 887, 889–91 (2003); Bradford Updike, Making Sense of Family Limited
Partnership Law After Strangi and Stone: A Better Approach to Planning and Litigation Through the Bona
Fide Transaction Exception, 50 S.D. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005))).
35. Kenneth P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby, III, Family Limited Partnerships: Decanting Family
Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 133 (1995).
36. For a discussion of Kimbell, see infra Section III.C.1.
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one another, so that each person’s stock is deemed held by the others as well.37
These attribution rules determine control of a corporation. Family attribution
was the IRS’s original position regarding minority shares in FLPs. Revenue
Ruling 81-253 states that, absent evidence of family discord sufficient to prevent
family members from cooperating, interests in entities controlled by a family
would be valued as if they were owned by a single individual.38 This seems to
create a rebuttable presumption that families work together to maximize family
wealth and that discounts were only merited if the plaintiffs could prove
otherwise in a particular case.
This view suffered a major defeat in Estate of Bright v. United States39 and
Propstra v. United States.40 In Bright, the IRS opposed valuation discounts for
shares in a closely held corporation.41 Professor Russell Stanaland summarized
the Bright case as follows:
[A] husband and wife owned fifty-five percent of the stock of an
affiliated group of corporations as community property. The wife, who
predeceased her husband, had devised her half, 27.5% of the stock, to a
trust for the benefit of her children with the husband named as trustee.
This devise was subject to a transfer tax.42
There were no recent sales of the stock by which to calculate value, however,
because the stock was not publicly traded.43 “[T]he estate used an appraised fair
market value and then claimed a fifty percent discount due to lack of liquidity
and lack of marketability of the minority interest.”44 The appraiser valued the
27.5% at $4,402,970, which adjusted for inflation would be over $13 million
today.45 The IRS opposed the discount and assessed additional tax and interest,
based on the fair market value, of more than $3,000,000 upon the estate.46

37. 26 U.S.C. § 318(a)(1)(A).
38. See Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187 (“[T]here is no evidence of the kind of family discord
or other factor that would indicate that the family would not act as a unit in controlling the
corporation.”).
39. 658 F.2d 999 (Former 5th Cir. 1981).
40. 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
41. 658 F.2d at 1001.
42. Russell Stanaland, Valuation Discounts After Estate of Norwell v. Commissioner: A Clear
Formula for Reducing Estate Taxes, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 679, 691 (2000).
43. Bright, 658 F.2d at 1000. The remaining 45% of the stock was owned by three or four
individuals, with one person owning 30%. Id.
44. Stanaland, supra note 42, at 691 & n.96 (“In this case, an expert witness established the value
of the stock. The dissent points out the value of the 27.5% interest was placed at $4,402,970 and a
discount of fifty percent was used to reduce this by $2,201,485.”); see also Bright, 658 F.2d at 1000; id.
at 1008 n.1 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
45. Ian Webster, Value of $4,402,970 from 1981 to 2021, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://
www.officialdata.org/us/inflation/1981?amount=4402970 [https://perma.cc/M9UJ-VN5E].
46. Stanaland, supra note 42, at 691; Bright, 658 F.2d at 1000.

100 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2022)

2021]

THE HAPPY FAMILIES OF TAX LAW

613

The estate paid the deficiency and sued for a refund, contesting the IRS’s
refusal to accept the discount.47 The estate won at the district court and the IRS
appealed.48 The Fifth Circuit rejected the IRS’s arguments that (1) the share of
stock was an undivided interest in the community property, and (2) the family
attribution rules should apply, giving a family member constructive ownership
of stock owned by another family member.49 This rejection was based both on
case law and legislative history.50 Specifically, it referenced the legislative
history of Regulation 20.2031-1(b), which introduces the “willing buyer-willing
seller” standard, defining the fair market value as “the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts.”51 Using the willing buyer-willing seller standard
requires that a minority discount apply, since a hypothetical buyer would likely
demand a discount before buying a minority share in a family corporation.
The IRS issued a statement of nonacquiescence to Bright in Revenue
Ruling 81-253, declining to allow minority discounts with respect to transfers
between family members unless it found evidence of family discord or other
factors indicating that a family could not act as a unit.52 Thus began the war
between the IRS and the Estate Planning Bar and its clients.
The next attack came in Propstra. In Propstra, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
because Congress had not explicitly required that family attribution rules apply
in estate tax situations, the court could not assume that Congress intended for
them to be applied.53 Without specific direction from Congress, the court ruled
that it could not require “[e]xecutors . . . to make delicate inquiries into the
feelings, attitudes, and anticipated behavior of those holding undivided
interests in the property in question.”54
At this point, the IRS acknowledged defeat and revoked Revenue Ruling
81-253 with Revenue Ruling 93-12, which states that family relationships will
not be considered when valuing gifts of stock in closely held corporations.55
Periodically, there have been legislative proposals to bring family attribution
rules back to the FLP: The House Ways and Means Committee Report of the
1987 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act recommended family attribution in

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Bright, 658 F.2d at 1000.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1005 (citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965)).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965).
See Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187–88.
680 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1252.
Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202–03.
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the FLP context.56 The Certain Estate Tax Relief Act of 200957 proposed
denying minority discounts where the transferee and members of the
transferee’s family have control of the entity.58 These efforts have not been
successful.
Two notable cases put to rest the idea that valuation discounts were a
desperate measure to save family businesses from dismemberment by estate
taxes. Estate of Watts v. Commissioner59 involved a family-owned Oregon lumber
company, Rosboro Lumber, valued between $28.2 and $42 million.60 The court
noted that:
The language in [the estate planning] documents indicates . . . [the]
partners’ intent to continue Rosboro as a going concern. Rosboro had
long been a close family partnership and it was quite clear that all the
partners and particularly Mr. Cole, the managing partner, intended to
keep it that way. Rosboro was not dissolved upon Watts’ death, nor was
it going to be.61
Nonetheless, the court agreed with the estate’s proposed 35% lack of
marketability discount.62
This decision illustrates the peculiar logic of discounts. The estate was
devalued by 35% due to the difficulty of selling the overall shares of the family
business on the open market, yet the court acknowledged that none of the
owners were remotely interested in selling at the time. Indeed, there was
testimony that anyone who tried to sell shares would face legal action by the
company.63 Given this family context, the value on the open market seems like
an irrelevant standard—or even a perverse one, since it used a standard whose
relevance the family implicitly eschewed.64

56. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1041–44 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-378, 2313764 to 2313-769; see Lee A. Sheppard, The Need for Family Limited Partnership Legislation, 2 TAX NOTES
1095, 1099 (1999).
57. H.R. 436, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
58. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL 144 (J. Comm. Print
2009).
59. 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 60 (1985), aff’d, 823 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 62.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 63.
63. Id.
64. Coverdale, supra note 2, at 265 n.161 (citing James Edward Harris, Valuation of Closely Held
Partnerships and Corporations: Recent Developments Concerning Minority Interest and Lack of Marketability
Discounts, 42 ARK. L. REV. 649, 650–54 (1989)). Professor Coverdale notes that Professor Harris argues
that “marketability discounts should not apply to controlling interests in privately held companies, or
at least that if some marketability discount applies, it cannot be based on the standard restricted stock
and IPO studies which focus on minority interests.” Id. Additionally, Professor Coverdale argues that,
while marketability discounts may be appropriate for family businesses, they are not appropriate for
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The other important case, Estate of Harrison, involved the patriarch of a
Texas oil family who had contributed assets worth $59,476,523 to an FLP before
his death.65 Because the assets contributed represented a limited partnership
interest, the estate argued that they should be discounted for estate tax
purposes, and the court agreed.66 As in Watts, the facts of this case make this
standard seem odd. The family’s fortune came from oil wells the decedent’s
father had discovered;67 the two brothers who inherited the estate were also oil
men who ran the business and showed no interest in selling it. Today, the family
is still in the Texas oil business, with an estimated fortune in the billions.68
C.

Criticism and Proposed Reform

Fast forward the discount wars to 2016, when the IRS issued new proposed
regulations to § 2704, thirteen years in the drafting, that would have taken a
small bite out of minority discounts, as I explain later in Part VI.69 Shortly
thereafter, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, and the
IRS withdrew the proposal.70 That leaves us where we are today, with a new
president who may be more inclined to address inequality with tax reform,
although he may also face a resistant Congress.71 In this context, I revisit the
criticism of valuation discounts, offer a new analysis, and propose a new regime.
D.

Critiques and Proposed Solutions

Others have expertly and thoroughly covered the history and rationale of
valuation discounts,72 so I only summarize these topics here. Although tax
the investment vehicles that often constitute FLPs because “the last thing [these] owners would
consider is selling their interest to an outsider.” Id. at 266.
65. Estate of Harrison v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1307 (1987).
66. Id. at 1310–11.
67. See id. at 1307.
68. Christopher Helman, America’s Oil and Gas Billionaires, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2013, 12:48 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/03/04/americas-oil-and-gas-billionaires/?sh=fe
ef8247df59 [https://perma.cc/H7GK-3US7].
69. Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes; Restrictions on Liquidation of an
Interest, 81 Fed. Reg. 51,413 (proposed Aug. 4, 2016) (withdrawn Oct. 20, 2017).
70. See id.
71. The House of Representatives for the 117th Congress is comprised of 214 Republicans
(including one Delegate and the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico) and 224 Democrats
(including four Delegates). JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46705, MEMBERSHIP OF
THE 117TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2021). The Senate for the 117th Congress holds an even closer
divide with forty-eight Democratic Senators (with two Independents joining their caucus) and fifty
Republican Senators. Id. Vice President Kamala Harris, a Democrat, serves as the tie-breaking vote in
the case of a Senate split. Id.
72. One of the earliest forays into the field is Mary Louise Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing
Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth
Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1978). Professor Brant J. Hellwig noted that Karen C. Burke and
Grayson M.P. McCouch’s article Family Limited Partnerships: Discounts, Options, and Disappearing Value,
6 FLA. TAX REV. 649 (2004) is a more recent example of scholarship concerning valuation discounts.
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lawyers, accountants, and estate planning attorneys tout these discounts as an
estate planning tool that can significantly reduce the value of a decedent’s estate
and the value of gifts for tax purposes,73 they have drawn considerable fire—
and, at times, incredulity—from tax scholars.74 One scholar stated, “[t]he tax
avoidance possibilities that derive from the continued availability of discounts
for transfers of fractional interests among family members undermine the
integrity of the transfer tax system and make a mockery of the principles of tax
equity.”75 Professor Joseph Dodge blames discounts for, among other things,
“drastic weakening of the wealth transfer taxes—both by legislation and the
failure to address loopholes that are exploited by transactions that make little or
no sense apart from tax avoidance.”76 Professor Brant Hellwig has called them
a “form of self-serv[ing] tax reduction [that] has undermined the integrity of
the already politically precarious estate and gift tax regime.”77
These critics have proposed various solutions. Dodge proposes excluding
from the discount regime family-held investment companies, as well as any
situation where the discount arises because of marital property rights or gifts.78
Hellwig proposed revising the definition of “adequate and full consideration in
money or money’s worth” and that the “bona fide sale” qualifier be defined and
employed consistently under both the estate and gift tax provisions.79 Professor
Mitchell Gans has argued that the same family attribution rules in income tax
law should also apply to the wealth transfer tax.80 And twenty-five years ago,
Professor James Repetti suggested that a presumption of control should operate

See Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted Partnership Interests and Adequate Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REV.
531, 538 n.14 (2009). Professor Hellwig summarizes that article as “advocating consistent treatment
between the tax treatment of partnership formations and assignment of partnership interests, either
through the finding of a gift on formation or the disallowance of entity-level discounts upon the transfer
of a partnership interest.” Id.
73. See, e.g., What Kind of Valuation Discounts Do Irrevocable Trusts Offer?, EST. & BUS. L. GRP.,
https://eblawgroup.com/what-kind-of-valuation-discounts-do-irrevocable-trusts-offer/ [https://perma
.cc/4TE4-ZLPM]; SHELLEY DRURY, VALUATION DISCOUNTS FOR GIFT AND ESTATE TAX
SAVINGS: HOW GETTING VALUATION NOW CAN SAVE YOU LATER, THE DOTY GRP., P.S.,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bc0c8149b8fe87850886f63/t/5dcc6e8582775766ce79b53b/1573
678757827/Valuation+Discounts+-+Gift+and+Estate+Savings [https://perma.cc/WA4P-XMTQ].
74. See, e.g., Stanley D. Neeleman, Kasner Disregards Sound Tax Policy, Says Professor, 61 TAX
NOTES 867, 867 (1993); see also Dodge, supra note 2, at 1029–30; Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted
Partnership Interests and Adequate Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REV. 531, 533 (2009) [hereinafter Hellwig,
Adequate Consideration].
75. Neeleman, supra note 74, at 867.
76. Dodge, supra note 2, at 1000.
77. Hellwig, Adequate Consideration, supra note 74, at 537.
78. Dodge, supra note 2, at 1031–32.
79. Hellwig, Adequate Consideration, supra note 74, at 617–18.
80. Gans & Soled, supra note 5, at 785 (“The first step would be to use a set of attribution rules
akin to those in sections 267(b) and 318(a) to determine what the transferor owns, both directly and
constructively (i.e., by means of attribution).”).
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to recapture the value lost under the current rules when a transferor who
controls an asset transfers part of the asset as a way of reducing taxes.81
These critiques have attacked discounts for many valid reasons: for
undermining the integrity of the tax system, shrinking the tax base, contributing
to inequality, and straining sheer logic beyond the breaking point. Here, I break
new ground by making their unspoken underlying assumptions explicit and by
putting those assumptions to the test. Specifically, I address the underlying
assumptions about wealthy families and their inability to cooperate to maximize
wealth. Not all high-wealth families are dysfunctional. But, as it turns out, it is
easy to spot the ones that are.
II. UNHAPPY FAMILIES AND HOW TO SPOT THEM
Unhappy families are not hard to spot. Conflicts erupt at predictable
“hinge moments”82 in family business life cycles and around certain predictable
issues. For example, a troubled succession might lead to a founder losing
influence she might have counted on retaining or to a later generation losing
interest in the business and bleeding it for cash to the detriment of
nonmanaging shareholders.83 Sibling discord in the second generation might
result in a freeze out of a member.84 At the third generation, the “cousin
consortium” conflict might arise between those who work in the business and
those who merely want distributions.85 As the line descends from the founders,
generations increasingly risk losing connection with the company’s values and
vision. These problems can lead to disunity in the family, creating the risk of
mistreatment of minority shareholders. In such a situation, a minority
shareholder, deprived of fair input and compensation, and unable to sell her
shares on the open market, might very well suffer a loss in value of her shares.
In this part, I first discuss “hinge moments” that arose in the sagas of several
wealthy business families. I then explain three tools that wealth preservation
advisors use to prevent these breakdowns at these critical junctures: family
governance, family identity creation, and family therapy.

81. See James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L.
REV. 415, 486 (1995).
82. “Hinge moment” is a term Princeton physicist Freeman Dyson used to describe a
connection point that ties two distinct periods in time. Doug Sosnik, America’s Hinge Moment,
POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/2016-predictionsamericas-sosnik-clinton-116480/ [https://perma.cc/6TWU-CTG9].
83. See Harry Levinson, Conflicts That Plague Family Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.
1971), https://hbr.org/1971/03/conflicts-that-plague-family-businesses [https://perma.cc/LY5J-E2WY]
(discussing the troubles that beset succeeding generations of family businesses).
84. See id.
85. KELIN E. GERSICK, JOHN A. DAVIS, MARION MCCOLLUM HAMPTON & IVAN LANSBERG,
GENERATION TO GENERATION: LIFE CYCLES OF THE FAMILY BUSINESS 215–16 (1997).
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“Hinge Moments”

The most difficult time in a family business is often the time of
succession.86 Psychological studies suggest that founding entrepreneurs have
unresolved conflicts with their fathers (these studies focused on men and may
be less accurate in the case of female founders).87 Because of this, these founders
tend to resist authority and fear rivalry.88 These emotional issues, of course,
spell trouble for succession planning. While a founder facing succession may
consciously want to pass the business on to his heirs, subconsciously, he may
fear losing hard-won authority and ceding power to someone else. Such a
founder keeps promising to retire but constantly finds excuses not to do so.89
The heir, meanwhile, feels cheated and victimized. If there is more than one
presumptive heir, the founder may play them off against each other, causing
further conflict based on rivalry among the children.90 Another stressful
psychological aspect of succession is an Oedipal catch-22, more common in
father-son succession cases, in which the son or employee “must imitate the boss
to succeed, and . . . must not imitate the boss to succeed.”91 The second
generation, the sibling generation, may also be plagued with rivalries among
themselves that stems from old grudges and slights. At the next stage, often
called the stage of the “cousin consortium,” there exists a danger that some
family members may lose their connection with the goals and values of the
business and treat it as a source of funds.92 At each generation, there is also the
possibility of parent-child conflicts erupting into the business.
In addition to these life cycle “hinge moments,” other issues predictably
lead to discord in family businesses. A common one is the question of capital
allocation: the tension between feeding the profits back into the company so it
can grow, on the one hand, and on the other, the desire of family members for
dividends to fund their lifestyles.93 Family members who feel deprived of
86. See Levinson, supra note 83; Peter S. Davis & Paula D. Harveston, In the Founder’s Shadow:
Conflict in the Family Firm, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 311, 313 (“[T]he transition between the founder and the
next generation of leadership is often seen as the most critical and tumultuous.”).
87. Levinson, supra note 83. Hugh Hefner’s transition of his business to his daughter, Christine,
is an example of a successful father-daughter succession. See Stephen Rebello, A Candid Conversation
with Christie Hefner, Playboy Enterprise’s Former President and CEO, PLAYBOY (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.playboy.com/read/playboy-interview-christie-hefner [https://perma.cc/6X5A-N5AP].
88. Levinson, supra note 83.
89. Id.
90. See discussion infra Section III.A.3.
91. Jim Grote, Conflicting Generations: A New Theory of Family Business Rivalry, 16 FAM. BUS. REV.
113, 119 (2003).
92. See GERSICK ET AL., supra note 85, at 18–19. For additional discussions of the life cycles of
the family business, see generally FRED NEUBAUER & ALDEN G. LANK, THE FAMILY BUSINESS: ITS
GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY (1998), and BENJAMIN BENSON, EDWIN T. CREGO & RONALD
H. DRUCKER, YOUR FAMILY BUSINESS: A SUCCESS GUIDE FOR GROWTH AND SURVIVAL (1990).
93. Scott E. Friedman, Andrea H. HusVar & Eliza P. Friedman, Advising Family Businesses in the
Twenty-First Century: An Introduction to Stage 4 Planning™ Strategies, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 425, 455 (2017).
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dividends bring lawsuits based on squeeze outs.94 These family members may
truly suffer from minority shareholder status because they lack the votes to
change the company’s capital-asset allocations and increase their payouts.95
Majority shareholders can use this squeeze-out tactic to drive out minority
shareholders from the business.96 Regarding conflict, advisors encourage family
members to agree on an allocation plan that reflects agreed-upon ways to
address capital needs, fund retirements and save taxes.97
1. Anheuser Busch: Oedipal Struggles
Cycles of fracture and collapse have appeared dramatically in several
prominent high-wealth business families. The Busch family provides an
example.98 Adolphus Busch founded and became president of the Anheuser
Busch brewing company in 1880, and upon his death in 1913, the company
passed to his son, August A.99 This generational transition went fairly smoothly,
partly because the succession was uncontested,100 and August A. was able to lead
the company through Prohibition by selling “near beer” and beer ingredients.101
With the third generation, in a classic father-son succession clash, August
Jr. (Adolphus’s grandson), or Gussie, quarreled with his father, August A., and
his son, August III, over how the business should be run.102 At one point, Gussie
even asked for August III’s letter of resignation.103 Although other top
executives managed to smooth things over initially, another family business
crisis arose: it became clear that Gussie had no interest in retiring and handing
Anheuser Busch on to the next generation.104 Eventually, August III got rid of
his father on terms author William Knoedelseder describes as “brutal,” forcing
him out, depriving him of any role in running the business, use of company
cars, planes, boats or rail cars—even of personal land he had bought.105 In a rage,
94. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976);
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and Freeze-Outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
497, 498–99 (1995).
95. Gevurtz, supra note 94, at 498–99.
96. Soren Lindstrom & Lindsey Reighard, How To Effectively Deal with Minority Shareholders:
Some Practice Pointers and Recent Developments, 36 CORP. COUNS. REV. 187, 194–95 (2017).
97. See Friedman et al., supra note 93, at 455–56.
98. For the two leading accounts of the Anheuser Busch company, see WILLIAM
KNOEDELSEDER, BITTER BREW: THE RISE AND FALL OF ANHEUSER BUSCH AND AMERICA’S
KINGS OF BEER (2014), and PETER HERNON & TERRY GANEY, UNDER THE INFLUENCE: THE
UNAUTHORIZED STORY OF THE ANHEUSER BUSCH DYNASTY (1991).
99. See KNOEDELSEDER, supra note 98, at 16, 22, 28.
100. Id. at 28. Fortuitously for August, all but one of his brothers had died by this point, and the
one remaining son had been born disabled. Id.
101. See id. at 117; HERNON & GANEY, supra note 98, at 133–34.
102. KNOEDELSEDER, supra note 98, at 117–19.
103. See id. at 118.
104. Id. at 119.
105. Id. at 137.
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Gussie demanded that all family members take sides in the fight.106 This
scenario has the elements of a classic succession fight, a crisis that factionalizes
the family. Wealth advisors target succession conflict by encouraging succession
planning from an early stage and setting out everyone’s expectations for their
roles in the business.
As for Anheuser Busch, from the point of Gussie’s firing the family
descended into intermittent “wealthy family” mayhem. This seems to be a
classic case of succeeding generations lacking a sense of the continuity of family
values, leaving them only with a sense of entitlement that rules don’t apply to
them. First, one of Gussie’s sons shot and killed a family friend “by accident”
at the Busch home (and received probation).107 Then, a few years later, August
IV killed a passenger while driving drunk (and served no time), began doing
serious amounts of cocaine, and got into a car chase with police after an evening
of drugs and partying (there was a public trial, but he was acquitted).108 Soon,
the company was manifesting similar lawlessness and disregard for family—not
to mention legal—values.109 There was another trial, this time of company
executives for mail fraud, tax fraud, and taking kickbacks from clients.110 The
fifth generation heir, August IV, descended into full-time drug use and
partying.111 Finally, August IV appeared at a national distributors meeting in
Washington in May of 2008, in Knoedelseder’s words, “[in] a deep state of
stoned,” confusing his words and unable to read the teleprompter.112
Knoedelseder ascribes August’s stress partly to the pressure he felt as heirpresumptive:
In the Busch family, it seemed as if the firstborn son was offered in
sacrifice to the company. The Fourth knew from the age of cognizance
that he was expected to become CEO one day. He had no choice in the
matter; doing something else with his life was not an option. He also
knew he would only become CEO if and when his father judged him
worthy. The job was his to lose, every day. The scrutiny was unrelenting,
the criticism constant.113
August IV had surrounded himself at the company with executives chosen
“more for their fealty to him than their knowledge of the business.”114 He
106. Id. at 138.
107. Id. at 147–49, 153.
108. Id. at 196–205, 209–18.
109. Id. at 138–40.
110. Id. at 239–40.
111. Id. at 195–96, 208.
112. Id. at 4–5. While the teleprompter said, “[w]hen our forefathers arrived on these shores, one
of the first things they did was to erect a beer house,” August IV said, “[w]hen our forefathers arrived
on these shores with erections.” Id. at 4.
113. Id. at 260.
114. Id. at 277.
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proceeded to make numerous bad business decisions, including a line of sweettasting alcohol in small bottles that looked like nail polish, marketed under the
name “Spykes,”115 and to lead a life of partying and drugs. Eventually, Anheuser
Busch sold out to InBev, a major Belgian brewer, a move that, in the words of
Fox News, brought “to an end one of the most iconic names in American
business.”116 This seems like a classic case of subsequent generations losing touch
with the values that inspired the business and kept the family together.
Another famous example of a succession fight broke out within the Dart
Drug family when it reached its financial peak—worth $500 million—in 1993.117
In June of that year, the Wall Street Journal prematurely reported that Robert,
the son, was sure to inherit his father’s position as head of the company.118 In a
rage, Robert’s father immediately fired Robert and sent a fax from his lawyer
telling him he was banned from the premises.119 Robert sued for wrongful
termination, a divorce ensued, and the family split into factions which remain
estranged today.120 Such a scenario might justify minority discounts because
there was an obvious power struggle going on between father and son, which
would have disadvantaged the minority shareholder or anyone in the “wrong”
family faction. Again, this is a typical “hinge moment,” and exactly the kind of
minatory tale wealth advisors share with their clients to urge succession
planning.
This trajectory is just what wealth preservation specialists aim to prevent.
Successive leaders of the business lose touch with the core values and goals of
the company and the family’s legacy. In the words of one wealth advisor, “latergeneration family members are rarely motivated by the same emotions that
fueled the productivity of the originator of the initial family wealth.”121
Unhealthy intergenerational dynamics compound the problem. In a generation
where some heirs are wasting company assets and making foolish business
decisions, a minority shareholder lacking control to right the company’s course
and unable to sell on the open market would suffer a loss in value.122
115. Id. at 306 (“He apparently didn’t grasp that the critics weren’t so much worried about
underage college girls carrying around Spykes in their purses as they were about their twelve- and
thirteen-year-old daughters who had nail polish bottles on their makeup tables that looked exactly like
Spykes.”).
116. Anheuser-Busch Agrees to InBev Sale, FOX NEWS, https://www.foxnews.com/story/anheuserbusch-agrees-to-inbev-sale [https://perma.cc/GY9V-4K42] (Jan. 13, 2015).
117. David J. Morrow, Denouement of a Family Feud?, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1999), https://www.
nytimes.com/1999/06/20/business/private-sector-denouement-of-a-family-feud.html [https://perma.
cc/FZM2-3MS9 (dark archive)].
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 8.
122. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513–14 (Mass.
1975).
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2. Vanderbilts and Bronfmans: Losing Connection
There is no shortage of further examples. Arthur T. Vanderbilt’s account
of his family’s saga, titled Fortune’s Children: The Fall of the House of Vanderbilt,
traces the same sad arc.123 The founder of the family business, Cornelius
Vanderbilt, was the world’s richest man by 1877; fifty years later, one of his
direct descendants died broke, and the family name had disappeared from the
Forbes list of the world’s richest people.124 The explanation for the
disappearance of the Vanderbilt fortune is simple: the heirs spent it all.125 Part
of the problem, as usual, was succession and loss of connection with family
legacy and values. Cornelius had warned about splitting the family fortune, but
when his son Billy died in 1885, he left it to both of Billy’s sons. This was when
the spending began. The third generation’s “extensive philanthropy and
spending left an estate reportedly worth the amount he had inherited in 1885
when his father died.”126 In April of 2004, “6th generation Vanderbilt Anderson
Cooper told Howard Stern’s radio show: ‘My mom’s made clear to me that
there’s no trust fund.’”127
And then there were the Bronfmans, the family that founded Seagram’s.
Sam Bronfman built the business into the first worldwide wine and spirits
company and his son Edgar continued to grow it.128 Then Edgar’s son, Edgar
Jr., made numerous ill-advised business decisions, most egregious of which was
selling Seagram’s stake in DuPont and investing in Universal Studios in a bid
to become a media tycoon.129 In doing so, Edgar Jr. broke with seventy years of
family business sense: he chose to rely on valuation systems which were “not
only . . . far removed from financial reality but a complete reversal of the
financial conservatism that had marked all the family’s businesses for seventy
years.”130 The family lost most of its fortune when it was forced to sell Seagram’s
for less than its full value to the French company Vivendi.131 As the debacle
unfolded at the end of 2001, one executive scribbled a note to another: “I’ve got

123. ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT II, FORTUNE’S CHILDREN: THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF
VANDERBILT 416–17 (1989) (“The Vanderbilt money is certainly bringing no happiness and no
greatness to its present claimants . . . .”).
124. Natalie Robehmed, The Vanderbilts: How American Royalty Lost Their Crown Jewels, FORBES
MAG. (Jul. 14, 2014, 10:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2014/07/14/thevanderbilts-how-american-royalty-lost-their-crown-jewels/?sh=38e86ed4353b [https://perma.cc/A43
M-YZNG (dark archive)].
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See NICHOLAS FAITH, THE BRONFMANS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HOUSE OF
SEAGRAM 173 (2006).
129. See id. at 246–64.
130. Id. at 260.
131. See id. at 280–98.
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the unpleasant feeling of being in a car whose driver is accelerating in the turns
and that I’m in the death seat.”132
3. Mars: Really, Really Bad Parenting
The Mars company was also dysfunctional,133 although it still managed to
remain profitable.134 Succession was problematic for the chocolate maker from
the first father-son transition.135 Founder Frank Mars made a classic mistake,
much warned against in today’s wealth preservation literature—he let his son
Forrest start at the top instead of making him work his way up and learn the
business from the bottom.136 He nonetheless also behaved in typical fatherfounder fashion by constantly criticizing Forrest and reminding him that he,
Frank, could run the company much better.137 When, in 1943, Forrest
demanded to be made a one-third partner of the business, Frank refused.138
According to Forrest, he told his father to “stick his business up his ass” and left
for Europe to start a company there.139 Another bump in the road resulted from
the blended Mars family: when Frank died, he was married to Ethel, his second
wife and Forrest’s stepmother, to whom he left half the company.140 Forrest
shared the rest with his half-sister Patty and a company manager who also
owned minority shares.141 Ethel promoted her half-brother to president so he
could run the company, and he and Forrest, who felt that the company was
rightfully his, did not get along.142 As a minority shareholder, however, he could
neither control the business, nor put his ideas into production, nor persuade his
132. Id. at 280.
133. The two principal accounts of the Mars family saga are JOËL GLENN BRENNER, THE
EMPERORS OF CHOCOLATE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF HERSHEY AND MARS (1999), and
JAN POTTKER, CRISIS IN CANDYLAND: MELTING THE CHOCOLATE SHELL OF THE MARS FAMILY
EMPIRE (1995).
134. But maybe not as profitable as it could be. In 1982, Mars turned down Steven Spielberg’s
request to feature M&Ms in the blockbuster, ET, leaving Reese’s Pieces to fill the spot. Graham
Flanagan, How M&Ms Passed on the Product Placement Opportunity of a Lifetime, BUS. INSIDER (June
17, 2014, 2:11 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/mms-product-placement-fails-2014-6 [https://
perma.cc/VEB6-8CES]. The movie placement caused a $65 million spike in Reese’s Pieces sales. Id.
Mars also turned down placements on the sitcom Seinfeld; the writers instead had Kramer accidentally
toss Junior Mints into the body of a patient in surgery. Id. Some have speculated that an inability to
take risks and move in new directions is a psychological characteristic of the Mars brothers, who still
fear making mistakes and angering their father. See POTTKER, supra note 133, at 81.
135. See BRENNER, supra note 133, at 59–60, 173–74, and POTTKER, supra note 133, at 35–39, 42–
43, for discussion of the troubled transition between Frank Mars and his son, Forrest.
136. See POTTKER, supra note 133, at 36.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 36–37.
139. Id. at 37.
140. Id. at 43. This was understandable: Ethel had been a true partner in the business, selling candy
door-to-door and sacrificing considerably to get the company off the ground. Id.
141. See id. at 54.
142. See id. at 55–56.
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stepmother and sister to sell him their shares.143 Eventually, after Ethel died,
Forrest was able to gain a majority of shares, but, until then, the company,
which was run by factions each loyal to a different owner, did poorly.144
Father-son dynamics continued to malfunction in the next generation.
Forrest’s children—Forrest Jr., John, and Jackie—did not see much of either of
their parents while growing up, and, when they began working at the business,
their father “treated [them] worse than he treated any other associates, yelling
at them, haranguing them[,] and screaming so loudly that he could be heard in
the next room.”145 Despite the abuse, Forrest kept promoting them,
simultaneously setting them against each other and forcing each one to curry
favor with him at the other’s expense—a dynamic, according to one author, that
“continues to this day.”146
Many years later, Forrest expressed regret about handing the business to
his children, reportedly saying that “[h]e would ‘never do it again. Not turn it
over to his kids, anyway . . . .’”147 At the fourth generation, the “cousin
consortium” stage, none of the cousins, all of whom grew up wealthy, have been
able or willing to return the company to its former status.148
As these stories make clear, discord erupts at predictable times and around
predictable issues in family businesses: generational succession, sibling control,
“cousin consortium,” capital allocation, salaries versus dividends. Clearly,
Oedipal struggles plagued the Busch and the Mars families, even though there
were clear lines of succession. In the case of the Vanderbilts, it was the lack of
clear succession and the splitting of the business that led to failure. In each of
these situations, it would be easy to see how minority shareholders might suffer
harm. But wealth advisors help families prepare for these foreseeable problems
and forestall disunity.
III. FIXING FAMILIES
Invoking Tolstoy again—what is the difference between the happy and
unhappy families of tax law? That is, what makes some families cooperate to
manage assets and maximize wealth while others find it impossible? One answer
is, of course, that some families simply have better dynamics than others.
Successful dynastic families have found ways to cooperate for centuries; those
that did not, fell apart and went bankrupt, often in three generations.149 But the
143. Id. at 56.
144. Id. at 63–64.
145. Id. at 69.
146. Id. at 81.
147. Id. at 239.
148. Id. at 239–40.
149. The Stroh family’s story is typical, although it might be modified to “shirtsleeves to
shirtsleeves in six.” Kerry A. Dolan, How To Blow $9 Billion: The Fallen Stroh Family, FORBES (July 8,
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other answer is that a family with uncooperative dynamics can hire a wealth
preservation advisor.150 These specialists teach business- or trust-owning
families to separate the family’s emotional life from its financial life and to
employ best practices for managing their wealth. This advice seeks to prevent
exactly the disunity and lack of cooperation that can cause family members to
feel they are being treated unfairly, to suffer from their minority status, and to
wish to sell their shares.
Today, a battalion of wealth preservation advisors has reaped the lessons
of the past. They provide counseling, strategies, and management techniques to
ensure that families get along and keep their wealth and businesses intact.
Undergirding this endeavor is what Professor Allison Tait has called “the law
of high-wealth exceptionalism,” a regime of private government that enables
these families to agree on and carry out wealth preservation strategies while
keeping everything in the family.151 Wealth preservation advisors achieve this
through various means: governing instruments such as family constitutions and
mission statements, asset allocation agreements among family members that
prioritize minimizing taxes,152 and training in conflict avoidance techniques.153
They also teach family members to sacrifice individual desires for the common
(family) good and teach families how to create a culture with its own unique set
of values and history that sets it apart from others.154 These forms of family
governance and culture creation nurture family business realities that leave the
Tax Code and its assumptions far behind. In fact, one could say that they
operate in a parallel universe: the Tax Code displays no inkling of how these
families operate and make its provisions irrelevant. Tax law’s oblivion to this
universe costs the rest of us $18 billion per year.155
The goal of the wealth preservation industry is for each family to have a
“one-hundred-year financial wealth preservation plan”156—that is, one that will
keep wealth in the family and growing for at least four generations.157 Wealth
2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2014/07/08/how-the-stroh-family-lostthe-largest-private-beer-fortune-in-the-u-s/?sh=e38b6ac3d13a [https://perma.cc/69Q3-FZYN (dark
archive)]. In the 1980s, Forbes estimated the family’s worth at $700 million, which by today just by
tracking the S&P should have grown to about $9 billion. See id. Instead, the Stroh company has ceased
to exist as a financial entity and has not paid out its last dividends. Id. The decline of the Strohs’ beer
business was precipitated by bad business decisions, family conflict and a generation who spent millions
on luxury items like collections of guns, cameras and guitars—and failed to grow the business. Id. There
is little left for the current generation, whose members are figuring out how to make their livings. Id.
150. See generally Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism, supra note 14 (discussing what wealth
preservation advisers do and the role they play in preserving family wealth).
151. See id. at 983.
152. I refer to these throughout as “wealth preservation documents.”
153. See Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 987–95.
154. See id. at 991–95.
155. See id. at 1032 n.300 (describing the decline in U.S. estate-tax receipts).
156. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 9.
157. Id. at 3–4.
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preservation advisors freely admit that this is an ambitious goal: as one has
observed, “[t]he phenomenon of the fleeting family fortune is so wellrecognized that it inspired a proverb: ‘[s]hirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three
generations.’”158 But, when families acquire the tools and techniques to set this
“one-hundred-year plan”159 in motion, they are clearly creating a wealth
structure that has no place in the valuation discount scheme. The goal here is
the same as that of the Rosboro lumber family: to create a system of wealth
management that will not give anyone on the inside a reason to sell. Valuing
shares based on the fiction that such a family member might want to sell her
shares on the open market is simply that—a fiction. Any hypothetical value on
the open market is irrelevant to the value of the share in the hands of the family,
where it will stay.
Happy tax families can achieve this—and, increasingly, they use the Tax
Code to do so. They keep wealth in the family while avoiding taxes based on
fictions about selling the family business and valuing it on the open market.
This allows them to grow their wealth at low or nonexistent tax rates. In this
part, I first detail the tools and strategies high-wealth advisors use to help
families create their one-hundred-year plans: family governance documents and
the creation of family identity. Then, I present two examples of families whose
wealth management makes a mockery of the discount regime. One is the family
in Kimbell v. United States.160 The second family is the Hobby Lobby family of
David Green. Both exemplify the self-contained and self-governing world of
the family business.161
A.

Family Governance and Boards of Directors

To shift family dynamics from power to structure, high-wealth advisors
deploy governing structures and governing documents to impose rational order
on the running of the business. The means are twofold: creating written policies
and governance documents that everyone has agreed to; and establishing a
board of directors with nonfamily members to help make major decisions and

158. Id. at 3.
159. As of this writing, the phrase, “one-hundred-year plan” seems to also reference a variety of
op-eds and a book arguing that China is engaged in a hundred-year marathon to overtake the United
States as the world’s superpower. See MICHAEL PILLSBURY, THE HUNDRED-YEAR MARATHON:
CHINA’S SECRET STRATEGY TO REPLACE AMERICA AS THE GLOBAL SUPERPOWER 12–14 (2015).
The phrase, “five-year plan,” famously referred to “a continuing series of Soviet governmental
programs designed to achieve usually specified goals in the planned, coordinated, and cumulative
development of the Soviet economy and other sectors of Soviet life (as education and science) over a
period of five years.” Five Year Plan, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/five-year%20plan [https://perma.cc/6FUV-JYRP].
160. 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004).
161. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (demonstrating how
a national family business gains exceptions to federal insurance laws).
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to mitigate—and mediate—family disputes.162 In fact, most advisors strongly
urge family businesses to move to professional management “as soon as
possible.”163 Especially in cases of conflict, or “inadequately rationalized
territories,” one author asserts, “members of the family should move up and out
of operations as quickly as possible.”164 Obviously, this would have potentially
mitigated considerable trouble in the Anheuser-Busch family and have avoided
some of August IV’s disastrous business decisions.165
Essentially, the wealth industry teaches these families to think of
themselves as a collective rather than as a collection of individuals.166 This
collective “family governance begins with the . . . joint decision of two
individuals to subordinate their individual freedoms of choice to a system of
representative governance in which each has a role.”167 Under this compact, the
family members “assert[] their shared values and goals and their willingness to
govern themselves according to those values and goals.”168 What one author calls
“[t]he Horizontal Social Compact” is key to “[t]he ability of siblings and
cousins . . . to work together [which] is critical to long-term wealth
preservation.”169 It should be clear that this “social compact” creates a family
world far removed from the one the Tax Code envisions when it allows
valuation discounts based on minority freeze outs.170 It creates a system which
everyone has agreed to for addressing disagreements and conflicts, so that
family members will not be driven to sell their shares in the family business on
the regulations’ envisioned “open market.”171 This family governance attempts
to ensure that differences are resolved within a collaborative framework
reflecting values to which all members have agreed to.
This family vision also teaches self-sacrifice for the good of the whole. In
How To Make Your Family Business Last, Mitzi Perdue, wife of the late Frank
Perdue and member of the Henderson family who founded the Hilton hotel
chain, advises that members of “high-functioning” (specifically, wealthpreserving and harmonious) families “can’t expect always to get their way,” and
instead must learn to “support the family and at times make sacrifices for the

162. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 88.
163. Id. at 76.
164. Levinson, supra note 83.
165. See generally KNOEDELSEDER, supra note 98 (describing the successes and failures of the
Anheuser-Busch company through the lens of the Busch family dynasty).
166. DANIELA MONTEMERLO & JOHN L. WARD, THE FAMILY CONSTITUTION: AGREEMENTS
TO SECURE AND PERPETUATE YOUR FAMILY AND YOUR BUSINESS 4 (2006).
167. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 15.
168. Id. at 20.
169. Id. at 21.
170. Id.
171. The rules for valuation discounts refer to the lack of market, since no one would want to buy
into the family.
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family.”172 She warns members that they do not “get the benefit of [their]
family’s financial and social benefits without owing a lot in return.”173 Parents
must teach their children that the family comes first, and that “losing your
family over something like an inheritance issue is probably the worst choice you
could possibly make,” while also not allowing them to become “addicted to
being right.”174 To build a unified family culture, Perdue suggests establishing
family traditions. For those families lacking their own indigenous rituals, she
helpfully offers a list of suggestions, such as family walks, “holding hands while
saying a blessing,” “Perseid Shower watching nights,” and discussing what
happened each day at dinner.175 Each suggestion is freshly minted and ready to
be inserted into a family’s culture. It is easy to imagine how such a family
culture might have saved the families behind Anheuser Busch, Seagram’s and
Vanderbilt from imploding as they did.176 As well as instilling a sense of selfsacrifice for the good of the whole, these instructions serve to create strong
family bonds and healthy family dynamics.
Family business advisors also urge their clients to create a family council.177
Such a council can be an elected or appointed group of family members whose
role is to make decisions about the business and educate other family members
about it. The council’s “fundamental purpose . . . is to provide a forum in which
family members can articulate their values, needs and expectations vis-á-vis the
company and develop policies that safeguard the long-term interests of the
family.”178 Further, the council can help families clarify and confirm in writing
“their shared values, vision, and mission, and through that process and those

172. MITZI PERDUE, HOW TO MAKE YOUR FAMILY BUSINESS LAST: TECHNIQUES, ADVICE,
CHECKLISTS, AND RESOURCES FOR KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS IN THE FAMILY 6 (2017).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 7, 14.
175. Id. at 18–19. At times, this book verges on parody, at least to outsiders like this author: Perdue
advises making “Married-Ins” feel like part of the family by sending them a “Now-You’re-One-Of-Us
Welcome Kit” with samples of the products the family makes but helpfully warns readers to keep it
appropriate—she recalls a classmate whose family business was sanitary napkins. Id. at 40. At another
point, she urges family members to ride public transportation to rub elbows with “average people.” Id.
at 35.
176. See generally Anheuser-Busch Agrees to InBev Sale, supra note 116 (detailing the sale of AnheuserBusch after the Busch family’s failures); Robehmed, supra note 124 (discussing the fall of the Vanderbilt
family); FAITH, supra note 128 (discussing the failures of the Bronfman family behind Seagram’s).
177. Ernesto J. Poza, Rediscovering Just How Much Patient Family Ownership Matters, FAM. BUS.
MAG., Fall 2009, https://www.familybusinessmagazine.com/rediscovering-just-how-much-patientfamily-ownership-matters [https://perma.cc/YF62-MPNG]. A substantial amount of literature
regarding the family council exists. See, e.g., Julia Suess, Family Governance—Literature Review and the
Development of a Conceptual Model, 5 J. FAM. BUS. STRATEGY 138, 142–43 (2014); Marta M. BerentBraun & Lorraine M. Uhlaner, Family Governance Practices and Teambuilding: Paradox of the Enterprising
Family, 38 SMALL BUS. ECON. 103, 107–08 (2012); CRAIG E. ARONOFF, STEPHEN L. MCCLURE &
JOHN L. WARD, FAMILY BUSINESS COMPENSATION 63 (1993).
178. GERSICK ET AL., supra note 85, at 237.
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guiding principles, reach further agreement on plans and policies that are
particularly important to the family.”179
This council becomes especially critical at keeping families cohesive as
subsequent generations take over, that is, in the sibling or cousin stage.180 In
these stages, the family council is critical, according to wealth advisors, in
“forging family consensus and counteracting declining family bonds and low
identification with the firm, as families grow and spontaneous social contacts
among family members decrease, articulating a strategy for family wealth
management, including planning, rule setting, and collaborative asset
allocation . . . [and] supporting succession planning” by exploring the family’s
“collective dream of continuity.”181 Of course, not all families so advised do this,
but those who do so successfully seem likely to avoid the moral slippage and
confusion. The consequences of ignoring this advice are apparent in Gussie
Busch’s disastrous Spykes campaign, the uncontrolled spending of the
Vanderbilts, and Edgar Bronfman’s narcissistic business ventures.182
A crucial instrument of family governance that tax laws should take note
of is the family constitution.183 While one of the goals of the family constitution179. Friedman et al., supra note 93, at 442–43.
180. Ivan Lansberg, The Best Investment the Family Can Make, FAM. BUS. MAG., Winter 2007, at
1, 1–2.
181. Kelin Gersick & Neus Feliu, Governing the Family Enterprise: Practices, Performance and
Research, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY BUSINESS 196, 210 (Leif Melin, Mattias Nordqvist &
Pramodita Sharma eds., 2014).
182. See generally KNOEDELSEDER, supra note 98 (discussing the misadventures of Gussie Busch);
Robehmed, supra note 124 (discussing the Vanderbilt family); FAITH, supra note 128 (discussing Edgar
Bronfman’s failures).
183. See Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 983 n.1, 984 nn.6 & 7, 990 nn.26, 27 &
29 (2020); see also CHRISTIAN G. STEWART, HOW TO CRAFT YOUR OWN FAMILY CONSTITUTION:
AN OVERVIEW 1 (2013), http://www.familylegacyasia.com/whitepaper_pdf/Overview%20of%20how%
20to%20craft%20a%20family%20constitution.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5TR-RPVF]; HUGHES, supra
note 14, at 49; Abby Schultz, Why Asia’s Rich Need a Family Constitution, BARRON’S (Jan. 9,
2015), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-asias-rich-need-a-family-constitution-1420777286 [https
://perma.cc/2LY2-MRSF]; KPMG, CONSTRUCTING A FAMILY CONSTITUTION 1 (2010), https://
www.fambiz.com.au/wp-content/uploads/Constructing-a-Family-Constitution-KPMG.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EE74-UFM Z]; Karin Prangley & Anne Warren, We the Family: The Benefits of Creating a
Family Constitution, BROWN BROS. HARRIMAN (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bbh.com/
us/en/insights/private-banking-insights/we-the-family-the-benefits-of-creating-a-family-constitution.
html [https://perma.cc/YTW8-YVAT]; Brad Simmons, The Six Most Contentious Parts of a Family
Constitution, MUTUAL TR. (2019), https://web.archive.org/web/20190310012214/https:/familyoffice
insiders.mutualtrust.com.au/article/governance/six-common-pressure-points-family-constitution/
[https//perma.cc/3935-RXXV]; Varsha, Note on Family Constitution, LAWYERSCLUBINDIA (July 5,
2017), https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Note-on-Family-Constitution-8279.asp [https://
perma.cc/RZ66-Q9KC]; Brian Groom, The Rise of the Family Business Constitution, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5d06ec9e-c61b-11e7-b30e-a7c1c7c13aab [https://perma.cc/MX
4D-Dk3D] (noting the usefulness of family constitutions where a family’s goal is to manage and control
wealth over multiple generations). For large and multigenerational families, consultants recommend a
family constitution of up to seventy pages. Rocio Arteaga & Susana Menéndez-Requejo, Family
Constitution and Business Performance: Moderating Factors, 30 FAM. BUS. REV. 320, 325 (2017). These
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making process is to foster a cohesive family culture, “the uniqueness of their
tribe, and . . . their special place in it,”184 the truth is that these families have
much more in common than not. A reading of sample family constitutions
makes clear that their point is to preserve family wealth from “creditor claims,
family feuds, reckless investments”—and taxes.185 To keep wealth—and
business—in the family, the constitution often sets out rules for the
employment of family members in the business, remuneration, and dividends
for family members.186 Reading seemingly any family constitution will make a
few things clear: the family business is not for sale, and its rules and procedures
have been carefully designed to ensure that the business is managed to meet the
needs and wishes of individual family members in a way that makes everyone
happy to stay in and makes “lack of control” a nonissue.
The family constitution’s goal is to “keep family ownership united and to
forge a broad and strong owning family’s commitment to the future of the
family business.”187 While not legally binding, these constitutions are intended
to be “morally enforceable” and a “meaningful piece of a family’s culture.”188 A
family business that has taken the time to establish and ratify a constitution is
not one in which shareholders will want to sell their shares.
Another governing instrument is the family mission statement.189 This is
an expression of the “purpose, vision, values, and goals” of the family.190 The
“family mission statement is the starting point for organizing the family to
preserve its wealth.”191 This statement of shared values will become critical when
the family faces conflict and difficult decisions because it will give the family a
way to resolve them based on their agreed-upon values.192 One wealth
preservation advisor admits that crystalizing a family’s unique value system in
this way can be challenging because it serves to emphasize the particular family’s
“uniqueness.”193 He ruefully concedes the difficulty in getting a family to
recognize its “uniqueness” since “Americans still maintain the cultural myth of

consultants also allot six to eight months to draft a constitution, so family members can come to an
agreement on matters of family wealth and governance—which takes time. Id.
184. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 51.
185. Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 984–85 (citing Varsha, supra note 183).
186. Simmons, supra note 183, at 163.
187. MONTEMERLO & WARD, supra note 166, at 1.
188. Friedman et al., supra note 93, at 458 (citation omitted).
189. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 43. The literature on the family mission statement is also vast. See
Friedman et al., supra note 93, at 449 n.63 (citing an example of a mission statement from a familyowned business).
190. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 43.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 44. If business mission statements are anything to go by, these families are not unique
at all.

100 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2022)

2021]

THE HAPPY FAMILIES OF TAX LAW

631

common membership in the middle class.”194 Regretfully, however, Americans
must learn that “[w]ealth automatically sets a family apart” and articulates its
own “uniqueness.”195 The mission statement sets out a family’s history, its
chosen governance structure, and each person’s role in family governance.196 A
family may also articulate its specialness through family rituals, storytelling,
and the practice of writing family history.197
Because conflict over business control is one of the main causes of business
disintegration, family governance structures are specifically designed to avoid
it. There are even detailed instructions for communicating at family meetings.
One advisor urges to “[n]ever start a sentence with the word ‘[b]ut’” because
this word signals to the other speaker that “you didn’t listen affirmatively to
what was said.”198
B.

Fixing Unhappy Family Dynamics

Governing instruments and professional management are one side of the
family-harmony coin, but internal family dynamics also require attention, even
when they are insulated, to some extent, from the business. Family
constitutions are only part—if a very important part—of managing conflict in
family businesses.199 Even if a wealthy family does not take the time to draw up
a constitution, it must learn to deal with family conflict and prevent it from
destroying the business.
An important insight of wealth preservation is that it is a “question of
human behavior” and “a dynamic process of group activity, or governance.”200
To “preserve its wealth, a family must form a social compact among its members
reflecting its shared values, and each successive generation must reaffirm and
readopt that social contract.”201 To achieve this, a family must form a system of
representative governance, whose mission is “the enhancement of the pursuit
of happiness of each individual member.”202
This training seeks to impart a critical lesson—decisions about family
wealth and business management need to be insulated away from family
conflict. As one family business advisor puts it: “Successful business families
manage to balance the needs of [family] interest groups and to keep the domains
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 45–46.
Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 992.
HUGHES, supra note 14, at 46.
See, e.g., PERDUE, supra note 172, at 67; KENT RHODES & DAVID LANSKY, MANAGING
CONFLICT IN THE FAMILY BUSINESS: UNDERSTANDING CHALLENGES AT THE INTERSECTION OF
FAMILY AND BUSINESS 68 (2013).
200. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 14.
201. Id. at 19.
202. Id. at 4.
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[of family and business] separate through clear boundaries.”203 They achieve this
by operating their businesses “according to best business practices, while
minimizing the influence of potentially competing family interests,” and
“act[ing] as responsible shareholders and stakeholders in the best interest of the
enterprise.”204 As they pass the company to later generations, literature reminds
the founders to “articulate[] a vision and mission” which codifies the members’
commitment to “avoid the ‘ruler’ mentality of one family member dominating
those processes,” and to “operate as a team, as opposed to being led by one
family member dominating those processes.”205
As an example of systematic conflict avoidance, advisors urge families to
separate the issues of compensation for working in the business and the rewards
of ownership distributed from the business.206 They warn that paying all family
employees the same amount, regardless of qualifications, often “feeds rivalry
and jealousy in the next generation.”207 To avoid this,
[c]ompensation for family members must be realistic. Those working in
the business should neither be overly compensated nor paid minimum
wage (unless that is appropriate to the job) . . . . The compensation
should be appropriate for the job being done; if it is too low, the family
member may be drawn elsewhere, but if [it] is too high, they will be
trapped, and may experience a disincentive to truly being productive.208
Most importantly, family issues must be separated from issues of pay. “Above
all, compensation should not be tied to need.”209 If a family member is in need
of other funds, the family should have capital allocation plans set in place to
address such eventualities.210
Employing family members presents another problem the family must
account for with rules and procedures. According to one consultant, “[e]ffective
policies generally include minimum educational and experience requirements,
a clear application process, advancement criteria, and a disciplinary and
termination process.”211 This consultant goes on to advise families to make clear
“that they will not artificially create jobs” for otherwise unqualified or unneeded
family members, and that they require “some employment experience outside
the family business” before being hired.212 Thus, when family members have
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

RHODES & LANSKY, supra note 199, at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 23 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 24.
Friedman et al., supra note 93, at 455 n.71 (quoting EDWARD F. KOREN, NON-TAX
CONSIDERATIONS IN FAMILY BUSINESS SUCCESSION PLANNING 46 (2011)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 455–56.
211. Id. at 457 n.77.
212. Id.
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satisfied the hiring requirements, then these members should fill positions
necessary to the business, and their pay should reflect the established
compensation plan.213 If shareholder-oppression cases are anything to go by,
claims of unfair compensation practices in family businesses are a major cause
of conflict in family businesses.214 As a result, wealth advisors try to prevent
these claims with early planning for family members’ roles in the business.
To help succession go smoothly—or happen in the first place—all family
business advisors insist on succession planning. Without such planning, “family
businesses can be put at great risk because of survivors competing to fill the
resulting vacuum in leadership without sufficient support and/or capable
successors.”215 These strategies of planning and articulating shared family values
and vision works to prevent fracture.216 A quantitative study of 100 nextgeneration family firm leaders and 350 family and nonfamily leaders and
employees found a positive correlation between the development of a shared
vision and effective next-generation leaders, which, in turn, increased the
“multigenerational survival rate” of family-owned businesses.217 All the troubled
families in the previous section began to fracture around succession. By insisting
on planning for this difficult transition, wealth advisors work to forestall the
psychological and emotional turmoil that can lead to infighting. This kind of
planning might have saved the Dart Drug company.
Advisors urge family members to have outside interests “from which they
can derive gratification equal to what they can obtain in the company.”218
Preventing family members from deriving all their emotional satisfaction from
the business can play a substantial role in keeping the business running
smoothly and prevents against poor decision-making. If this sounds like
therapeutic advice, it is. One suggestion is that family members should talk
about their conflicts and anger toward each other “in the presence of a neutral
third person[,] [s]ometimes [with] professional help.”219

213. Id.
214. See generally, e.g., ARONOFF ET AL., supra note 177 (discussing the matter of compensation in
the family business).
215. Friedman et al., supra note 93, at 452.
216. See id. at 449 n.61 (“For example, results from a quantitative study of 100 next-generation
family firm leaders and 350 family and non-family leaders and employees found a positive correlation
between the development of a shared vision and effective next-generation leaders, which, in turn,
increased the ‘multigenerational survival rate’ of family owned businesses.”).
217. Stephen P. Miller, Next-Generation Leadership Development in Family Businesses: The Critical
Roles of Shared Vision and Family Climate, FRONTIERS PSYCH., Dec. 2014, at 1, 10; see also UNC KenanFlagler Business School, The Importance of Shared Vision in a Family Business, YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://youtu.be/ienfwTuKSv0 [https://perma.cc/E5V4-GHAM].
218. Levinson, supra note 83.
219. Id.
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These documents, governing bodies, and family rituals “serve as a compass
to guide behavior”220 in the interests of family wealth and business preservation.
They foster a “positive family climate” as much as a successful business one.221
In doing so, they paint a picture of a world in which valuation discounts have
no place. When families set in place dynamics that will prevent the
disadvantaging of minority shareholders, they will likely avoid the exact
scenarios that the tax rules envision: freeze outs, squeeze outs, shareholders
wishing to get rid of their shares, and more. In fact, the whole purpose of these
wealth preservation regimes and all their apparatus is to keep the family and its
wealth separate, functioning smoothly as a harmonious whole. They spell out
in detail “basic expectations about employment and compensation systems,
stock ownership, and dividend policies, and marriage and divorce.”222 Families
with significant wealth as well as a business spell out investment policies and
“responsible stewardship of the wealth for future generations.”223 Attorney
James E. Hughes Jr. describes an example of this stewardship as:
[T]he allocation to each family member on the family balance sheet
(whether the member is an individual or a trust, a pooled vehicle, or a
philanthropy) of that portion of the family’s financial assets most likely
to assist the long-term growth of those financial assets while minimizing
U.S., estate, gift, or generation-skipping transfer taxation.224
For example, this system would allocate to “the oldest family member . . . the
investments offering the lowest growth, and the youngest family member buys
the investments offering the highest growth.”225 This way, “the family [will be]
delighted because Grandmother’s estate didn’t grow even though the family
balance sheet” did226—perhaps they can celebrate while watching a Perseid
shower. When everyone in the family agrees to participate in the investor
allocation process because it is good for the family as a whole: it turns the family
into a vast, well-oiled, tax-avoidance machine.
Hughes offers advice specific to trust management in the family. The
strategy of family unity also smooths out trustee-beneficiary relationships in
the context of the family trust—another vehicle to which the discount valuation
rules apply. According to Hughes, the goal of the trust is that “the relationship
between the beneficiary and the trustee be so smooth that each sees himself as
an equal member of a team working for a common goal of long-term family
220. Friedman et al., supra note 93, at 444.
221. Id. at 449 (citation omitted).
222. James John Jurinski & Gary A. Zwick, How To Prevent and Solve Operating Problems in the
Family Business, 47 PRAC. LAW. 37, 43 (2001).
223. Id. at 38.
224. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 64.
225. Id. at 65.
226. Id. at 66.
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wealth preservation.”227 The beneficiary’s role is to become educated about the
role of the trustee and to meet with the trustee regularly to discuss long-term
personal goals and how the trust can contribute to them. The trustee’s role is to
be a mentor, balance the needs of all the beneficiaries, and help the family
members achieve their goals.228 This joint governance of the trust should create
a “positive experience for both parties” in which the “likelihood of ever facing
a turndown [of a request for funds] is very small.”229 Such a regime of trust
management makes it unlikely that a beneficiary will feel cheated out of her fair
share of distributions.
A good example of how a trust for such a family might look is the Kaestner
Family Trust, at issue in North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kaestner.230
This trust instrument allowed the trustee, while making distribution decisions,
to “consider only the interests of the person or persons for whom it is deemed
advisable to use income or principal and not the interests of any other person
who at any time may be or become interested in any trust hereunder.”231 In
other words, the trust allows the trustee to distribute all of the assets to one
beneficiary without taking into account the needs or future needs of any
others.232 This language seems designed to grant the trustee maximum
discretion in making distribution decisions, but it is hard to believe that the
settlor would have had it drafted this way if he had really thought the trustee
would have depleted the trust for one child and left nothing for the others (there
were three beneficiaries in the first generation). It seems more likely that the
family and the trustee had an understanding about how the children would
receive the distributions and could be relied upon not to quarrel with each other
or the trustee.
A related approach to conflicts in the family business is “paradox
management,” a term coined by the authors of the book Family Business as
Paradox.233 These authors urge their readers (and clients—they all offer
consulting services to family business owners) to see conflicts in their businesses
as paradoxes requiring management.234 These “paradoxes” are more challenging
than “solvable problems” and require a special technique: recognizing that both

227. Id. at 111.
228. Id. at 111–23.
229. Id. at 112, 119.
230. 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).
231. Joseph Lee Rice III, Family 1992 Trust, art. 1.4(b) (Dec. 30, 1992) (unpublished trust) (on
file with author).
232. This absolves the trustee of liability for any breach of the duty of impartiality among
beneficiaries.
233. See AMY SCHUMAN, STACY STUTZ & JOHN L. WARD, FAMILY BUSINESS AS PARADOX 100
(2010).
234. Id. at 11–12.
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sides have validity, learning to live with ambiguity, and creatively getting past
the paradox.235
The paradox authors identify the same stress points in the family business
that other consultants do. At the founder stage, the tension is between the
founder’s urgent wish to act and move forward and the need for planning,
research, and stewardship.236 Conflicts at the sibling stage revolve around
leadership and decision-making, while at the stage of the “cousin consortium,”
the challenges emerge from conflicting views of and roles in the business. For
example, cousins may exhibit tensions over salaries and dividend payouts.237
Like most other family business consultants, the paradox authors recommend
expressly stated company polices about employment and shareholder issues, as
well as a family mission statement and constitution, to help avoid and solve
these conflicts. These vehicles, they suggest, allow families to “dig deeper” into
these conflicts “in search of the underlying paradox” and then address the
paradox with these “strong governance vehicles.”238
This procedure works because it returns the family back to the basic rules
and values they originally agreed upon and resolves the paradox based on those
rules and values. For example, a conflict in the second and third generations is
typically between employment and compensation, those who manage and those
who only receive dividends, and those who do not play an active management
role.239 Under the surface of these conflicts, the paradoxes the authors identify
concern whether to implement strict rules and requirements for entry into the
business or an open-door policy for family members. This boils down to the
paradox of exclusion versus inclusion and resolving it requires understanding
both sides and acknowledging that they both have validity. Once discussion—
perhaps mediated by a consultant—has occurred, the family’s “strong
governance vehicles” can be referred to, or created, to address issues in a way
that all the family members can agree on. For example, in most family
businesses, members all agree that a primary goal of the business is its
continuity and preservation of the business for future generations. The
governing instruments remind them of this main value. In doing so, these value
statements allow for resolution of the conflict.
These wealth preservation strategies achieve outcomes similar to those of
family therapy. Specifically, they operate much like family-systems therapy, a
form of practice most famously developed by psychiatrist Murray Bowen.240
The practice is defined as a school of therapy which helps family members to
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. at 12.
See id. at 60.
See id. at 66–71.
Id. at 90.
See id. at 80–85.
See MURRAY BOWEN, FAMILY THERAPY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE, at xvii (1993).
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achieve a healthy psychological balance between their emotional involvement
with their families and their own individuality.241 Family-systems theory sees
families as unified emotional units which Bowen calls the “undifferentiated
family ego mass.”242 While emotional fusion is present in most families, it is
most intense in the least mature families and only disappears when “family
members have attained complete emotional maturity.”243 The goal of this type
of family therapy is for one member to “differentiate a self from the amorphous
we-ness” of the family ego mass.244 When one person achieves this
differentiation, she is able to control her responses to family emotional triggers,
and she moves toward achieving maturity and selfhood.245 In other words, the
balance of the “togetherness-individuality forces in a family [must] exactly
balance each other out.”246 Conversely, a “lack of differentiation among the
individuals in [a family] leads to a social crisis.”247 This is what leads to trouble
in families and in family businesses.
The role of the therapist is to help ease tensions in the family by allowing
each member to achieve differentiation within the family and to identify
patterns that make the family dysfunctional. Family business consultants
simply apply these insights to the family business. The therapist achieves this
by “remain[ing] free of the emotional field between [family members] while
actively relating to each.”248 A member who has achieved this differentiation
can avoid responding irrationally to emotional triggers from other members and
instead respond to dilemmas logically. In the family-business context, this
means making decisions based on best business practices rather than emotional
entanglement with family members.
Manuals of wealth preservation advise discovering and breaking family
patterns of dysfunction to achieve family stability through individual and group
adhesion.249 Translated into the language of family-business counseling, familysystems therapy seeks to “identify family patterns that impair operations or
impede business progress.”250 They create a space free from what Bowen calls
241. See id. at 294–95.
242. Id. at 107.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. See id. at 217.
246. Id. at 277.
247. RENE GIRARD, RESURRECTION FROM THE UNDERGROUND: FEODOR DOSTOEVSKY 49–
51 (1997).
248. BOWEN, supra note 240, at 251 (emphasis omitted).
249. Playing the role of therapist in this context might not be as dangerous as it sounds. Bowen
calls family group therapy “one of the easiest methods for the inexperienced therapist” requiring only
that she be able to “relat[e] to multiple people in a group without taking sides and without becoming
too entangled in the family emotional system.” Id. at 295.
250. Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs, Family Businesses and the Business of Families: A
Consideration of the Role of the Lawyer, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 153, 167–68 (1998). For a discussion

100 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2022)

638

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

the family’s “enmeshment”—its members’ emotional entanglement with one
another that causes them to react irrationally to stimuli from other members.
Translated into business therapy: families can manage conflict by setting
boundaries between personal and professional interactions.251 For example, one
such manual describes successful business families as ones which “operate their
businesses according to best business practices, while minimizing the influence
of potentially competing family interests.”252 These authors present a checklist
for family business owners to assess their conflict management skills.253 It asks,
among other things, “[h]ave I made time to check out my own interpretation of
information or events with other family members?”254 “How might I develop a
more open-minded approach . . . to other family members’ interpretation of . . .
events?”255 “Can I separate my feelings from what the other person may have
intended?”256 “Which of my own buttons is being pushed right now?”257 “Is my
reaction in proportion to the conflict?”258
It is not hard to imagine how these governance and therapy strategies
could have aided the families discussed in the previous part. The AnheuserBusch family offers a good example. As the beer company passed down the
generations, there were clearly a number of psychological problems that
emerged: dangerously destructive father-son dynamics, enormous psychological
pressure on successor-sons, and a succession fight that led to self- and businessdestructive behavior.259 It is impossible to know, but one can imagine how a
wealth preservation advisor, employed early on, could have put in place vision
and mission statements and succession planning that might have allowed the
family to orient themselves around the future of the company rather than their
own personal tensions. And a board of professional directors would have made
a huge difference in running the company. All of these tools would perhaps
have prevented some of the worst decisions, such as the Spykes marketing
disaster, and the sale to InBev might never have become a necessity. Similar
problems appear in the Dart Drug family feud. Wealth preservation advisors
of the literature of systems applied to business, see generally id. at 154 n.9 (citing DAVID BORK,
FAMILY BUSINESS, RISKY BUSINESS: HOW TO MAKE IT WORK (1986); W. GIBB DYER, JR.,
CULTURAL CHANGE IN FAMILY FIRMS: ANTICIPATING AND MANAGING BUSINESS AND FAMILY
TRANSITIONS (1986); and JOHN L. WARD, KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS HEALTHY: HOW TO
PLAN FOR CONTINUING GROWTH, PROFITABILITY, AND FAMILY LEADERSHIP (1987)).
251. Samantha K. Ammons, Work-Family Boundary Strategies: Stability and Alignment Between
Preferred and Enacted Boundaries, 82 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 49, 50 (2013).
252. RHODES & LANSKY, supra note 199, at 16.
253. Id. at 57–58.
254. Id. at 57.
255. Id. at 58.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See KNOEDELSEDER, supra note 98, at 100–10.
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are adept at forestalling these toxic father-son dynamics and might have been
able to prevent the balkanization of this family as well.
Similarly, hindsight raises the question of what wealth preservation
advising could have done for the Bronfman family of Seagram’s. The thirdgeneration son, Edgar, Jr., seems to have lost all connection to the vision and
mission of the business, leading to his fatal decision to invest in media. Better
planning might have enabled him to try his luck in the movie business without
bankrupting his family’s company.
The Mars family also made classic mistakes that these advisors warn
against. For example, Forrest installed his sons at the top of the company rather
than making them work their way up and learn the business. This more gradual
absorption into the company might well have eased some of the successionrelated tensions that plagued it. It might also have released the sons from their
anxiety about risk and allowed them to make better decisions when Steven
Spielberg and Jerry Seinfeld came calling.
Of course, there is no way of knowing the extent to which competent
wealth preservation advising would have helped the above families. The overall
lesson here is simply that, even in the most dysfunctional families, there are
predictable moments of breakage and sources of tension. And the wealth
advising industry has found ways to address them to keep families cooperating
and maximizing growth.
C.

Happy Families: Kimbell and Green

While it is impossible to know anything for sure about the family
dynamics or internal governance of most families,260 sometimes enough
information emerges to allow for speculation. This section describes two
families for which such information is available. The first, the Texas oil family
of Ruth Kimbell, fought the IRS over valuation discounts for interests
transferred to a partnership a few years before Ruth’s death. The Fifth Circuit
case, Kimbell v. United States, demonstrated how the Kimbell family’s collective
management of family assets prevented future internal conflict. The second is
the family of David Green, founder of Hobby Lobby. Though the Green family
has not faced the IRS in court over a valuations issue,261 it seems to be an
example the kind of family-run, active business that exhibits the cooperation
and unity that I have argued belies their justification.

260. See generally Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism, supra note 14, at 1012–17 (“[A] problem
stemming from the financial exceptionalism of high-wealth families is the resultant financial privacy
and opacity.”).
261. It did, however, lose a battle with the IRS about a charitable deduction made to its trust.
Green v. United States, 880 F.3d 519, 533 (10th Cir. 2018).
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1. Kimbell v. United States
Ruth A. Kimbell, the matriarch of a large Texas oil company, died in
1998.262 In the years before her death, she transferred much of her estate to
three entities. First, she created a revocable living trust. Then, a few years later,
her son and his wife created an LLC to which the trust contributed $20,000 for
a 50% interest.263 Later that year, the trust and the LLC formed a partnership
under Texas law, to which the trust contributed about $2.5 million in cash and
oil-related assets for a 99% limited partner interest.264 At this point, it should
be clear where this is headed: this transfer gave Ruth 99.5% ownership of the
partnership as a limited partner.265 The LLC was the general partner, with
authority to manage the assets and make distributions.266
Ruth’s estate filed its tax return in December 1998.267 The assets of the
partnership were worth $2.4 million, but the estate claimed a 49% discount in
Ruth’s interests in the LLC and the partnership for lack of control and
marketability.268 The estate actually claimed the discount under § 2036, a
different section of the Tax Code from the one I focus on here.269 But § 2036
arrives at the same discounts using the same logic. The only difference under
§ 2036 is that the test for allowing the discounts asks whether there was a “bona
fide” business reason for establishing the partnership under which the discounts
are claimed.270 The Kimbell court, in finding that “business reasons” justified the
formation of the partnership, again ignored obvious family reality.271
The IRS disagreed with the discounts claimed and increased the tax based
on its belief that the assets transferred to the LLC and the partnership were
includible in Ruth’s gross estate.272 The estate paid the deficiency and filed for
a refund; the district court ruled for the IRS.273 The estate appealed to the Fifth
Circuit.274
On appeal, the government argued that partnerships merited different
treatment for estate-tax purposes than from arm’s length transactions because
they are often “a vehicle for changing the form in which the decedent held his
property—a mere ‘recycling of value’ . . . only a paper transaction without
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 259.
I.R.C. § 2036 is the subject of a forthcoming second article on this topic by this author.
Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 261.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.

100 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2022)

2021]

THE HAPPY FAMILIES OF TAX LAW

641

substance.”275 The court agreed that transactions like this one among family
members were “subject to heightened scrutiny”276 but vacated the lower court’s
grant of summary judgment for the government and remanded for a finding of
whether the “objective facts” indicated that the transfers at issue were a “bona
fide sale” under § 2036(a)(2).277 The court helpfully set out “objective facts”278
it deemed indicative of a bona fide sale: Ruth retained “sufficient assets outside
the [p]artnership for her own support and there was no commingling of
[p]artnership and her personal assets”; “[p]artnership formalities were satisfied
and the assets contributed to the [p]artnership were actually assigned to the
[p]artnership”; “[t]he assets contributed to the [p]artnership included working
interests in oil and gas properties which do require active management”; and
the estate “advanced several credible and unchallenged non-tax business reasons
for the formation of the [p]artnership that could not be accomplished via Mrs.
Kimbell’s [t]rust” alone.279
In reality, however, these “objective facts” fail to support the conclusion
that there was a bona fide sale.280 The court found Ruth’s retained interest of
$450,000 in assets “sufficient . . . for her own support.”281 But even a few years
of long-term care for the eighty-nine-year-old Ruth would have used up this
amount. And of course, since “[t]he assets were formally assigned to the
[p]artnership,”282 the Kimbells could afford competent tax advice. The failure
to segregate assets is a well-known pitfall in FLP planning. It may be that the
assets assigned to the partnership required “active management,” but there was
no evidence that their management differed under the LLC from what it had
been before.283
The irony, however, is that the reasons offered for forming the partnership
clearly indicated that there was no basis for valuation discounts. For example,
one reason was that Mrs. Kimbell “wanted the oil and gas operations to continue
beyond her lifetime and . . . felt that by putting the assets in a limited
partnership, [the family] could keep the pool of capital together in one entity
275. Id. at 264–65.
276. Id. at 269. But see Kevin A. Lucid, It’s a Tax Thing: The Misnamed “Heightened Scrutiny”
Standard for Evaluating Family Limited Partnerships, 26 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 403, 429 (2013)
(demonstrating that the “heightened scrutiny” analysis that courts apply to FLP transfers is not as
demanding as the “heightened scrutiny” analysis that is applied in the Equal Protection Clause
context).
277. Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 267.
278. Id. at 260.
279. Id. at 267.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 269.
283. See Wendy Gerzog, Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone Awry, 61 TAX L. 775, 797
(2008) (critiquing the court’s analysis in Kimbell because “decedent was 96 years old, the assets
transferred to her FLP were mainly liquid ones, and management remained essentially the same”).
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that would be enhanced over time rather than subdivided by distributions to
subsequent generations,” and to “keep the asset[s] in an entity that would
preserve the property as separate property of her descendants.”284 During the
divorce of one of Mrs. Kimbell’s grandsons, the family was confronted with that
issue.285 To manage these issues, “[t]he partnership agreement provided that all
disputes be resolved through mediation or arbitration to avoid interfamily
litigation if disputes should arise.”286
In short, the goals of the partnership were to
increase Family wealth; establish a method by which annual gifts can be
made without fractionalizing Family Assets; continue the ownership and
collective operation of Family Assets and restrict the right of non-Family
members to acquire interests in Family Assets; provide protection to
Family Assets from claims of future creditors against Family
members . . . promote the Family’s knowledge of and communication
about Family Assets; provide resolution of any disputes which may arise
among the Family in order to preserve Family harmony and avoid the
expense and problems of litigation; and consolidate fractional interests
in Family Assets.287
In furtherance of these goals, the family had arranged its assets carefully to
avoid the very detriment which was the basis for its discounts. The phrase from
the partnership agreement itself, “collective operation of family assets” shows
that Ruth’s partnership interest was “limited” in name only. The family’s goal
was to manage its assets collectively to maximize their value.
Moreover, marketability discounts made no sense here because the
partnership agreement was designed to inhibit marketability. It created an
entity that was meant to be kept in the family, in one piece, to pass down as a
whole to future generations. Nor was lack of control—the other basis for
discounting—an issue: Ruth and her son, David, were cotrustees of the trust
that funded the partnership.288 The family’s wealth preservation strategy
worked: the family business’s initial public offering on February 3, 2017,
brought in $90 million.289 At the time of the case, it was worth slightly over
$2.6 million.290
The Kimbell court’s analysis is just one example of the kind of disembodied
analysis courts tend to apply to these transfers. By “disembodied,” I mean
284. Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 268.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 260.
288. Id. at 259.
289. Kimbell Royalty Partners Opens IPO, HARTENERGY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.hart
energy.com/news/kimbell-royalty-partners-opens-ipo-112487 [https://perma.cc/EM8U-JM2K].
290. Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 259. At least by this author’s calculation based on facts in the opinion.
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analysis that is disconnected from the actual relationships of the families
involved and what their acts of asset allocation meant within those relationships.
Rather than attend to substance, courts hover at the level of pure form, ignoring
the obvious reality below. That reality consisted of a succession that was from
a mother to an only child—a son—a relationship that usually escapes the
tensions of father-son transitions. Additionally, the lack of siblings, and a Texas
oil family with a tradition of keeping land and wealth in the family, also
indicated that the Kimbell family was a “happy” one. Though we do not know
whether this family had a constitution or any other governing instruments, the
partnership agreement itself served as a clear statement of the family’s mission:
collective management of family assets and the prevention of internecine
conflict.
2. The Hobby Lobby Family
As was the case with the Kimbells, the Hobby Lobby family offers an
example of a happy family of tax law.291 Again, we do not know whether the
family has a family constitution or mission statement, but we do know that its
business has a mission statement and a vision statement. Its mission statement
is “offering our customers exceptional selection and value. Serving our
employees and their families by establishing a work environment and company
policies that build character, strengthen individuals, and nurture families.”292
And, though the company has not yet published its complete vision statement,
it states that its vision is “to influence and market creative arts while
incorporating Christian values.”293 As with the Kimbell’s partnership
agreement, this mission statement and the partial vision statement tell a great
deal about how the family will run the company in the future. Rather than being
subject to disagreement and conflict, business decisions will be channeled
through the mission statement’s “exceptional selection and value” and
“nurturing families” requirements rather than the number of shares a member
owns. Green wrote a book about the company and his philosophy of business
and life behind it.294 As for selling, Green states:
Another thing I don’t have to mess with is dealing with stockholders and
all the federal and state paperwork of being a public company. We’re still
family-owned, which keeps life a whole lot simpler. When my wife and
291. Brian Solomon, Meet David Green: Hobby Lobby’s Biblical Billionaire, FORBES (Sept.
8, 2012, 7:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2012/09/18/david-green-the-biblicalbillionaire-backing-the-evangelical-movement/?sh=264dce335807 [https://perma.cc/NH5R-A7UJ
(dark archive)].
292. Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, https://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story [https://perma.
cc/6PQF-75SB].
293. Hobby Lobby Mission and Vision Statements Analysis, HOBBY LOBBY, https://mission-statement.
com/hobby-lobby/ [https://perma.cc/8M38-C26Q].
294. Id.
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kids and I decide to make a business move, we don’t have to ask Wall
Street about it.295
While the book is blatantly self-serving and irritatingly cloying, it
indirectly reveals the workings of a family business which functions as a selfcontained and harmonious unit. The book makes it clear that Hobby Lobby
runs so smoothly as a family-held company that both family and business are
run according to the same sets of religious values. Green references their
“corporate commitment to follow biblical principles in everything we do,” and
emphasizes that “[w]e on the executive team at Hobby Lobby are of one mind
on this.”296 The company employs a “full-time chaplain to meet employees’
needs.”297 Its Christian values shape its business policy as well. Green decided
to “go[] against the tide of American retail” by closing the stores at 8:00 p.m.
and on Sundays, despite taking a financial hit for doing so.298 He did so to help
fulfill the business’ mission statement goal of “nurturing families.”
Green has also successfully integrated family members into the business.
He insists that he has welcomed them into the company but only as “careful
stewards of this third generation and not to let our successes warp their view of
the hard work that life requires.”299 Indeed, the Green’s estate planning reflects
this concern: he told Forbes Magazine in 2017 how worried he was when wealth
“advisors . . . told him to set up his business affairs in a way which would cause
Hobby Lobby to be passed on to multiple generations of his descendants.”300
His worry: “What will this money do to them? How can he be assured that
future generations will not turn away from the original mission and culture of
the company and become a hundred ‘hooks’ into the company, taking from it
rather than giving to it?”301 According to the Forbes article, Green and his wife
resolved the issue by asking their children to put their 15% shares of the
company into a trust that was devoted to ensuring “that Hobby Lobby remains
true to the mission and values on which it was founded—in perpetuity.”302 This
295. DAVID GREEN WITH DEAN MERRILL, MORE THAN A HOBBY: HOW A $600 STARTUP
BECAME AMERICA’S HOME AND CRAFT SUPERSTORE 11 (2005).
296. Id. at 122–23.
297. Julie McGowan, Exec Recounts Hobby Lobby’s Ministry, BAPTIST PRESS (Dec. 29, 2008),
https://www.baptistpress.com/resource-library/news/exec-recounts-hobby-lobbys-ministry/ [https://
perma.cc/9SNN-X4JN].
298. GREEN WITH MERRILL, supra note 295, at 132–37. Green asserts that the stores at the time
were making $100 million per year on Sundays. Id. at 133.
299. Id. at 195.
300. Jerry Bowyer, Restoring Trust Through Trusts: Hobby Lobby CEO Is a Steward, Not an Owner,
FORBES (May 1, 2017, 11:08 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jerrybowyer/2017/05/01/restoringtrust-through-trusts-hobby-lobby-ceo-is-a-steward-not-an-owner/?sh=715f7bed3632 [https://perma.cc
/4L33-R5QL (dark archive)].
301. Id.
302. Id. This trust recently lost a battle with the IRS over a charitable tax deduction for property
it contained. Id.
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strategy, accompanied by the transmission of family culture, will likely forestall
the “cousin consortium” problems that plagued—and ultimately destroyed—
families like the Vanderbilts and the Strohs.
So far, we have seen that many government benefits accrue to happy highwealth families whose members cooperate to maximize their wealth. Because
the Tax Code assumes, without investigation, that these families do not
cooperate, they are able to save millions of dollars. The next part turns to the
other end of the wealth spectrum—where poor families also receive government
benefits. But, here, the law makes no assumptions about eligibility. Rather, the
law subjects these families to ruthless surveillance.
IV. TAX BREAKS, WELFARE, AND SURVEILLANCE OF THE POOR
As I have tried to make clear, the assumption of lack of family cooperation
underlying valuation discounts is often inappropriate in the culture of the happy
(or at least cooperative) tax families I have described, and I advocate for factfinding in cases where wealthy families decline to opt for the statutory safe
harbor I have proposed. Some will argue that it is too burdensome on the courts
and too intrusive into intimate family matters.303 They will cite the ideology of
the protected private sphere, removed from state interference and intrusion.304
In short, like the Propstra court, they will shudder at the prospect of inquiry into
the “delicate feelings, attitudes, and anticipated behavior of those holding
undivided interests in the property in question.”305
These objections are misplaced. First, government agencies are wellexperienced in investigating family dynamics when other public benefits are at
stake, and, second, by the same token, such intrusions into family life are not
unusual in the context of government benefits aimed at the poor. As the
literature of tax expenditures makes clear, the distinction between tax breaks for
the wealthy and direct relief payments to the poor is a false one. Both are “tax

303. Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Without an explicit directive
from Congress we cannot require executors to make such inquiries.”).
304. See Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 135–
36 nn.76 & 77 (2011) [hereinafter Bridges, Privacy Rights]. The cases that comprise this tradition of
judicial recognition of the domestic private sphere are iconic. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (calling the right of privacy within marriage “a right of privacy older than the Bill
of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system”); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (demarcating “the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter”);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535–36 (1925) (striking down legislation that undermined “the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (defining “liberty” under the Fourteenth
Amendment to include to the right to “marry, establish a home and bring up children”).
305. Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1252.
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expenditures”—that is, income the government has chosen to forego in the
interest, theoretically at least, of some policy goal.306
The Budget Act formally defines tax expenditures as: “Revenue losses
attributable to provisions of Federal income tax laws which allow a special
exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”307 In other
words, if a tax code applies a certain tax rate to a certain income level and then
reduces that tax by giving “credits” for, say, childcare, the amount lost to the
government is a “tax expenditure.”308
Stanley Surrey, a former Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, coined
the term “tax expenditure” in a 1967 speech.309 Surrey “compile[d] a list of
preferences and concessions in the income tax that were similar to expenditure
programs.”310 In addition to improving the budget process, he also wished to
highlight subsidies in the Tax Code in the interest of creating support for tax
reform.311 In 1968, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued the first tax
expenditure budget report, a practice that continues today.312
Prior to 2003, the estate and gift tax report contained a list of tax
expenditures.313 Economists Rosanne Altschuler and Robert Dietz note that
“[o]ne of the reasons given for the [2003] elimination of the tax expenditure
estimates under the estate and gift tax may be viewed as being political”—the
306. See Rosanne Altshuler & Robert Dietz, Reconsidering Tax Expenditure Estimation, 64 NAT’L
TAX J. 459, 460 (2011).
307. Id. at 459 (observing that “for many in the tax policy community, the term suggests tax breaks
for limited constituencies that result in a narrow tax base and higher marginal tax rates” or simply, “tax
expenditures are tax loopholes that need to be closed”); see also Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 622); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 2 (J. Comm. Print 2014).
308. This definition, of course, is the subject of contention. Despite widespread acceptance and
employment of the concept of tax expenditures through federal law and by organizations like the
Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and the Tax Policy Center, significant
questions about what tax provisions should be included remain. These questions generally involve what
to define as the “normal tax system” and what constitutes a “departure.” Nevertheless, there is general
agreement that “there are numerous provisions in the tax code that represent disguised spending under
any reasonable definition and would not be part of any broadly based, normative tax system.” ERIC J.
TODER, BENJAMIN H. HARRIS & KATHERINE LIM, URB.-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR.,
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (2009), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411922-Distributional-Effects-of-Tax-Expenditures.PDF
[https://perma.cc/N6J6-Z5YU]. This Article relies on analysis from the Congressional Budget Office,
the Tax Policy Center, and the Joint Committee on Taxation for discussion of what constitutes a tax
expenditure, the value of particular tax expenditures, and the distributional impact of those provisions.
309. Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Address Before the Money
Marketers: The U.S. Income Tax System—The Need for a Full Accounting (Nov. 15, 1967).
310. Altshuler & Dietz, supra note 306, at 460.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 460 n.1.
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fact that the tax had been repealed under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (“EGGTRA”), although EGGTRA was set to expire
at end of 2010.314 Valuation discounts, however, belong on the list of tax
expenditures because they deviate from valuation norms based on a legal
fiction—the loss of value.
As noted above, the main difference between welfare benefits for the poor
and tax benefits for the rich is that the latter are “hidden” tax breaks rather than
“handed out” directly.315 Some have called them “Welfare for the Wealthy.”316
As Professor Marjorie Kornhauser notes, “Americans generally define welfare
narrowly to mean helping the poor. . . . They tend not to call government
spending ‘welfare’ when it benefits middle and upper-income individuals or
corporations.”317 An oft-cited example is the different perceptions of housing
assistance for the poor and subsidies for middle class home ownership.318 The
lion’s share of tax benefits, however, goes to the middle and upper class. A 2006
study sponsored by the Pew Charitable Foundation found that: “approximately
seventy-two percent of federal spending to further economic mobility . . .
[benefited] middle- and higher-income individuals through such items as
housing support, in comparison to twenty-eight percent to lower- and
moderate-income individuals.”319 Much of that consisted of tax expenditures,
like those available through valuation discounts.320 Tax expenditures like these
are the hidden or submerged forms of welfare for the wealthy.321

314. Id.; see also OFF. OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TAX EXPENDITURES
UNDER THE ESTATE TAX 2 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/taxanalysis/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-Estate-Tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/G66S-YE7X] (“[T]he first
estate tax expenditure budget was published in the annual Budget for Fiscal Year 1994, alongside those
of the individual and corporate income taxes. The Budget continued to publish tax expenditures for
the estate tax for nine years. But for the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget, the estate tax expenditure section
was dropped, a change attributed at the time to a lack of agreement on an appropriate baseline to define
estate tax expenditures. Estate tax expenditures have remained out of the Budget since then.”).
315. HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE, supra note 8, at 3; see METTLER, supra note 8,
at 16–17; Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 272 (“[P]lacing general welfare (child tax credits, home mortgage
deductions, and education credits) within the tax system frames them so positively that they all but
disappear from consciousness.”). See generally FARICY, supra note 9 (examining the relationship between
political party power, social spending, and benefits to socioeconomic groups).
316. FARICY, supra note 9, at 11.
317. Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 261.
318. Id. at 261–62.
319. Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 262 & n.24.
320. Id. at 262 n.25. Professor Kornhauser noted that journalist David Cay Johnston “argu[ed] that
the rich have ‘captured’ the government, so much so that the subsidy often outweighs the economic
benefits it produces.” Id.; see also DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH: HOW THE WEALTHIEST
AMERICANS ENRICH THEMSELVES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE (AND STICK YOU WITH THE BILL)
7–8, 23 (2007) (asserting the subsidy outweighs the potential economic benefits because the rich have
“captured” the government).
321. See HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE, supra note 8, at 3; METTLER, supra note 8,
at 16–17; FARICY, supra note 9, at 25.
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These hidden forms of welfare are costly. In 2013, the ten largest tax
expenditures totaled over $900 billion or 5.6% of GDP. Of this amount, “more
than half of the combined benefits . . . accrue to households with income in the
highest income quintile . . . with 17[%] going to households in the top 1[%] of
the population.”322 This does not include the benefits attributable to minority
discounts.323 But discounts are one of the many forms of this “hidden
welfare.”324
Families benefiting from such a large percentage of government aid based
on assumptions about their intimate lives should be subject to the same
inspection and surveillance applied to those receiving a much smaller fraction.
However, as Professor Wendy Bach notes, “as one moves from benefits for the
poor to benefits for the rich, one can trace a linear progression from highly
invasive and punitive administrative systems to systems that function as near
entitlements.”325
The difference between the lack of scrutiny of wealthy families and the
invasive surveillance of poor families receiving analogous benefits is particularly
striking in the case of the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”). Credited with
lifting more families out of poverty than any other antipoverty measure,326 the
EITC allows a credit against taxes owed and a tax refund of up to $6,000.327
Filers must meet several requirements, including paid employment and the care

322. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 3 (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress2013-2014/reports/taxexpendituresone-column.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM45-WJU4].
323. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
324. Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 261 (“Americans generally define welfare narrowly to mean
helping the poor, what this Article labels ‘poor’ welfare. They tend not to call government spending
‘welfare’ when it benefits middle and upper-income individuals or corporations.”). The following is
only a sample of the vast literature on tax expenditures. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax
Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 275, 275 (2015) (“The federal government devotes over a trillion dollars
each year to tax provisions that pursue ‘nontax’ goals, such as the deduction for mortgage interest and
the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance.”); Jason S. Oh, The Social Cost of Tax Expenditure
Reform, 66 TAX L. REV. 63, 65 (2012) (explaining the social cost of business tax expenditures);
CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT
U.S. SOCIAL POLICY 122–23 (2007) (providing a classic discussion of tax expenditures). In 2019, tax
expenditures reduced the amount of income tax the federal government collected by $1.3 trillion and
cut payroll taxes and other sources of tax revenue by $140 billion. Policy Basics: Federal Tax Expenditures,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federaltax/federal-tax-expenditures [https://perma.cc/442B-S3BK].
325. Bach, supra note 8, at 498.
326. See STEVE HOLT, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE
30: WHAT WE KNOW 13 (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20060209
_Holt.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ4W-PYWW].
327. Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 2021), https://www.taxpolicy
center.org/briefing-book/what-earned-income-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/HXY6-r9w7].

100 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2022)

2021]

THE HAPPY FAMILIES OF TAX LAW

649

and custody of dependent children.328 Although this is a tax break like those
available under § 2704, the IRS treats EITC filers as presumptive tax cheats
from the outset.329
First, the IRS requires some EITC filers to be precertified by producing
additional documentation that they are eligible to file for the EITC.330 Second,
Congress and the General Accounting Office study “error rates” of EITC
filings to a degree unmatched by the study of any other classification of
returns.331 Third, as Professor Dorothy Brown has noted, “EITC taxpayers are
audited more than any other taxpayer group.”332 Indeed, about half of all
individual income tax examinations are EITC returns.333 On the other hand,
only about 5% of the tax gap—the difference between what the government
actually collects and what it would have collected with full compliance—is
attributable to EITC errors.334 Over half results from underreporting of selfemployment and business income.335 Further, there is no evidence that EITC
filers commit fraud more than other filers.336
This targeting is expensive. Brown calculates that “Congress has made
direct appropriations of over $1 billion since 1998 on EITC compliance
initiatives.”337 No comparable number is available for the compliance initiatives
for any other group of taxpayers, leading her to observe that “[i]f we wanted to
find out how much, if anything, the IRS spends on denying unlawful tax
328. Who Qualifies for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), IRS (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.
irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/who-qualifies-for-the-earned-income
-tax-credit-eitc [https://perma.cc/4EBB-HJZV].
329. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 791–
93 (2007) (noting that “[l]ow-income taxpayers are under attack” due to the “political rhetoric
surrounding the low-income tax credit”); see also Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, supra note
11, at 647 (“[M]any of the policies written into the federal and state welfare reform laws assumed a
latent criminality among the poor.”).
330. See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1870 (2005); I.R.S. Announcement 2003-40, 2003-1 C.B. 1132.
331. See Brown, supra note 329, at 800 (“EITC taxpayers have been targeted because they are
viewed as being the equivalent of welfare recipients. That perception in turn leads to a higher level of
scrutiny than that faced by any other taxpayer group.”).
332. Id. at 801.
333. Id. at 808; see also W. Edward Afield, Social Justice and the Low-Income Taxpayer, 64 VILL. L.
REV. 347, 353 (2019) (“[T]he EITC is subject to a high audit rate, even in a climate of low overall
governmental tax enforcement.”).
334. Stephen D. Holt, Keeping It in Context: Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance and Treatment of
the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183, 188 (2007).
335. Id.
336. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION REFUND FREEZE STUDY 13–14 (2005), https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/section_4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F234-Y56P] (analyzing Taxpayer Advocate Service cases involving refund freezes);
see also Holt, supra note 334, at 200–01 (listing reasons other than intentional misrepresentation for
EITC noncompliance, such as: the complexity of the rules, brokered noncompliance, and “Refund
Anticipation Loans” to buy big-ticket items such as cars).
337. See Brown, supra note 329, at 806.
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shelters to high income taxpayers, we can’t because those data are not separately
stated.”338
Brown ascribes the different treatment of families receiving EITC credits
to “the political rhetoric surrounding” the EITC.339 This rhetoric has framed
the EITC as a form of welfare, signaling government handouts to people too
lazy to work, although it clearly requires “earned income” for eligibility. In
doing so, Brown argues that politicians have made it “racially and politically
charged.”340 While whites receive welfare, it is not called welfare.
Courts and administrative agencies also routinely examine intimate details
of family life to establish poor people’s “eligibility” (some might say worthiness)
to receive welfare and other public benefits.341 Courts adjudicating alimony
disputes between former spouses routinely inquire as to who is sleeping with
whom.342 In this context, it is clear that such inquiries are nothing new for the
court system. They have simply been inequitably practiced. As one scholar puts
it: the poor “endure a barrage of information collection practices that are far
more invasive and degrading than those experienced by their wealthier
neighbors.”343 Moreover, “[t]he law reinforces this class differential in
privacy.”344 I might add that the discrepancies I describe in tax law specifically
do the same. They do so by forcing the poor to pay for benefits with invasions
of intimate life while handing the wealthy much greater benefits and allowing
them to escape similar scrutiny under cover of assumptions about their families.
The assumptions about poor families that animate welfare are quite different:
they are “the criminality of the poor . . . [and] the logics of crime control now
reign supreme over efforts to reduce poverty or to ameliorate its effects.”345
To illustrate the type of family scrutiny the poor face in applying for
benefits, take the case of Rocio Sanchez, who “applied for welfare benefits and
food stamps at a San Diego County welfare office to support her infant
daughter” after separating from her husband.346 The following facts are taken
from the complaint Ms. Sanchez filed as part of a class action asserting the

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id.
Id. at 792–93.
Id. at 794.
GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE, supra note 11, at 23.
CARLA SPIVACK, THE SMART WOMAN’S GUIDE TO PROPERTY LAW: PROTECT YOUR
ASSETS WHEN YOU LIVE WITH SOMEONE, MARRY, DIVORCE, AND MORE 40–51 (2020) (detailing
judicial investigation into intimate details of ex-spouses’ personal lives).
343. Gilman, supra note 3, at 1389–90.
344. Id. at 1390.
345. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE, supra note 11, at 1.
346. Gilman, supra note 3, at 1390. Gilman recounts the events of Rocio Sanchez in The Class
Differential in Privacy Law. Id. A comprehensive account of the facts are also available in the complaint
filed in Sanchez v. County of San Diego. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief
at 4–11, Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 00-CV-1467-JM(JFS) (S.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2000).
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unconstitutionality of the intrusion, as described by Michele Estrin Gilman in
The Class Differential in Privacy Law:
One month [after she filed for benefits], an investigator from the Public
Assistance Fraud Division of the San Diego District Attorney’s Office
made an unannounced visit to [Sanchez’s] home pursuant to a county
policy called Project 100%, which required home visits of all welfare
applicants who were not suspected of fraud or ineligibility. The
investigator asked Ms. Sanchez a series of questions about her husband
and his whereabouts, [including] when she had last talked with or seen
him, and the reasons for their separation. [The investigator] then
searched the home, including her bedroom closet, and left to question
her neighbors.
Ms. Sanchez encountered the investigator a few days later when he
arrived at her former residence searching for her husband. She was there
alone, cleaning the residence so that she could recover the rental security
deposit. In her presence, the investigator proceeded to search the
bathroom cabinets, the bedroom, and the dresser drawers—all of which
were empty. Again, he questioned Ms. Sanchez about her husband,
including asking why she was still speaking to her sister-in-law if she was
in fact separated. He demanded that she pull out papers from her
husband’s trash can that might lend clues to his location, remarking that
it was “funny” that she had never filed a domestic violence complaint.347
Ms. Sanchez filed a complaint as a member of a class challenging the
constitutionality of this invasion of privacy.348 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
“upheld the home visits against a Fourth Amendment challenge, reasoning that
‘a person’s relationship with the state can reduce that person’s expectation of
privacy, even within the sanctity of the home.’”349 Seven judges dissented from
the denial of an en banc rehearing, calling the case “nothing less than an attack
on the poor.”350 Gilman chronicles that the dissenters noted that
most government benefits do not flow to the poor, “yet this is the group
we require to sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy.” By
contrast, “[t]he government does not search through the closets and
medicine cabinets of farmers receiving subsidies. They do not dig
347. Id. at 1390; see also First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note
346, at 4–6.
348. Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 2006). Unfortunately, Ms.
Sanchez’s case is not unusual. See, e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 713 (Ct.
App. 2002) (dismissing a writ of mandamus challenging the searches because the home visits did not
contradict the purpose of the state welfare statute since the purpose of the searches was to determine
eligibility).
349. Gilman, supra note 3, at 1391 (quoting Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 927).
350. Id. (quoting Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 969 (Pregerson, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc)).
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through the laundry baskets and garbage pails of real estate developers
or radio broadcasters.” As the dissenters concluded, “This situation is
shameful.”351
Justice Douglas noted in his dissent from Wyman v. James,352 in which the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of home visits by welfare workers,
“[n]o such sums are spent policing the government subsidies granted to farmers,
airlines, steamship companies, and junk mail dealers, to name but a few.”353
These invasions of poor people’s privacy are widespread. Single mothers
seeking public assistance face drug tests, DNA testing of children,
fingerprinting and “intrusive questions about their child rearing and intimate
relationships.”354 Women seeking subsidized prenatal care often face interviews
by “a battery of professionals—including nurses, health educators, financial
officers, HIV counselors, and social workers.”355 These interviews include
questions about the mother’s relationship with the father, the father’s job,
financial support for the child, whether the child was wanted or planned, and
whether the mother has parenting skills or needs someone to teach her those
skills.356 It is worth noting that digital technology has enabled even more
invasive family surveillance of those receiving benefits. Many states now
distribute funds electronically, allowing for monitoring of who buys what
when.357
I draw an even tighter nexus here than the Ninth Circuit dissent did in
Sanchez. I compare the invasion of family privacy based on presumptions of
deceit—how else to explain the rummaging through garbage cans for evidence
of the husband’s presence—with the blanket presumption of the deserving
family in Chapter 14 of the Tax Code. Both of these presumptions authorize
the conferral of benefits, yet they are diametrically opposed as applied to the
two groups.
In rejecting Sanchez’s challenge to the home search, the Ninth Circuit
relied on the 1971 case of Wyman v. James, in which the Court answered the
question of whether the state could condition the receipt of public benefits on

351. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)).
352. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
353. Gilman, supra note 3, at 1413; see also id. at 1413 n.171.
354. Bridges, Privacy Rights, supra note 304, at 114–16 (discussing Medicaid); see Kaaryn Gustafson,
Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 312–
21 (2013); Gilman, supra note 3, at 1397–400 (discussing welfare).
355. Bridges, Privacy Rights, supra note 304, at 114.
356. Id. at 115–16.
357. Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data:
A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 123 (2017) (“[T]he digital world
will replicate, if not reinforce, both covert and overt patterns of surveillance [of the poor].”).

100 N.C. L. REV. 601 (2022)

2021]

THE HAPPY FAMILIES OF TAX LAW

653

regular home visits by caseworkers.358 The Court began its analysis with an
acknowledgment that “over the years, the Court consistently has been most
protective of the privacy of the dwelling,”359 but it went on to state that this
“quite proper and protective attitude” was irrelevant to the case at hand because
home visits fell outside of Fourth Amendment protections.360 There were two
reasons for this: first, these visits, according to the Court, were rehabilitative in
nature, rather than investigative, and second, the visits were consensual.361
These rationales drew fire from a range of sources.362 My purpose is not
to itemize them here. I focus rather on another rationale the Court offered: that
the state’s interest in the fiscal integrity of the public assistance program
justified the searches.363 Because “tax funds provided from federal as well as
from state sources” supported the relief at issue, the Court found a “paramount
interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects
of that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it
dispenses” because the public rightly “expects to know how [its] charitable funds
are utilized and put to work.”364
As Professor Jordan Budd has argued, Wyman’s reach has stretched further
and further in the decades since the decision.365 As Budd shows, investigatory
intrusion into the private spaces of aid recipients is now the norm in many
jurisdictions, conducted not by the at least putatively rehabilitative caseworkers
in Wyman, but by “law-enforcement officers whose sole purpose is to search the
home for evidence of ineligibility or fraud.”366 In San Diego County, for
example, as Budd points out, “Project 100%”—the subject of the Sanchez class
action—aims to ensure that every aid applicant submit to a “highly invasive”

358. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 309 (1971).
359. Id. at 316.
360. Id. at 317.
361. Id. at 317–18.
362. See Robert A. Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v.
James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1302–03 (1971); Harry Kalven, Jr., Forward: Even When a Nation Is at
War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 258, 259–62 (1971); see also Ginny Kim, Unconstitutional Conditions: Is the Fourth
Amendment for Sale in Public Housing?, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 180–84 (1995).
363. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318–19.
364. Id. at 319; Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 370 (2010) (analyzing the Court’s holding in Wyman).
365. Budd, supra note 364, at 375.
366. Id. at 380; see also Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2006)
(describing San Diego County’s program); id. at 934–36 (Fisher, J., dissenting); S.L. v. Whitburn, 67
F.3d 1299, 1301–03 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing Milwaukee County’s program); see also Bach, supra note
8, at 539 (“Not only have welfare agencies adopted the mechanisms and modalities of the criminal
justice system in the policing of the application and retention of welfare benefits, but they are part and
parcel of a system of intersecting regulatory systems that expose women and children to the risk of
ever-increasing punishment in the child welfare and criminal law systems.”); GUSTAFSON, CHEATING
WELFARE, supra note 11, at 1 (“Welfare rules assume the criminality of the poor . . . [and] the logics of
crime control now reign supreme over efforts to reduce poverty or to ameliorate its effects.”).
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home search by law enforcement officials.367 Applicants must show officials
“bank statements, pay stubs, tax returns, benefit check stubs, and other
documents . . . [N]othing is ‘off-limits.”368 Also, “[i]nvestigators may search any
space within the home that they deem relevant to verification,”369 and if the
applicant refuses inspection of any portion of the home then it will result in
denied benefits.370 Investigators can request “to look at the contents of
bedrooms, closets, kitchens, bathrooms, medicine cabinets and drawers in search
of evidence of ineligibility or fraud.”371 Looking primarily for traces of a male
presence, officials “count toothbrushes, look for men’s bath products, examine
the contents of laundry baskets, open refrigerators, and explore the contents of
trash cans and dresser drawers.”372 Budd points to other programs similar to
Project 100% in other jurisdictions around the country,373 noting that courts
have consistently found these searches constitutional under the “special needs”
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s protections.374 One court concluded that
“home visits at issue are reasonable intrusions upon an applicant’s privacy”
because the state has an interest in those who benefit from the tax-produced
assistance.375
Rather than argue with the logic of this line of cases, I propose to apply
their logic more broadly. If a “relationship with the state” and the receipt of
benefits from the public fisc require, as the Wyman Court stated, a citizen to
relinquish his expectation of privacy so the state may establish the truth of his
intimate relationships, then this principle should apply to everyone who
receives benefits at taxpayer’s expense. It should be obvious that this includes
the wealthy who receive tax breaks in the form of valuation discounts based an
implied assertion about family relationships.
While all tax breaks are a form of government benefit, discounts are
especially egregious. The main difference is that there is much more money at
stake. One commentator notes that “[e]very citizen is in a ‘relationship’ with
367. Budd, supra note 364, at 382.
368. Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 22–23, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122), 2004
WL 1949000, at *22–23; Budd, supra note 364, at 382 n.228 (citing Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening
Brief, supra, at 22–23).
369. Budd, supra note 364, at 382; see also id. at 382 n.229 (quoting Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego,
No. 00-CV-1467-JM(JFS), 2003 WL 25655642, at *8 n.8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2003) (“[N]o specific
protocol limits where the investigator may look . . . .”)).
370. Id. at 382; see also Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 368, at 27 n.20
(“[E]ligibility technicians deny applications if the Fraud Investigator reports that an applicant refused
to answer questions, or refused full entry to her residence.”).
371. Budd, supra note 364, at 382 (citing Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting)).
372. Id. at 382.
373. Id. at 383–85.
374. Id. at 395–404.
375. S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Budd, supra note 364, at 402–
03 (“[W]elfare applicants necessarily must have a diminished privacy expectation in view of the
benefits they seek to obtain.”).
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the government, and fraud abounds in all governmental programs. What will
distinguish this case from the case in which investigators want to rummage
through drawers in citizens’ homes to ‘prevent’ tax fraud?”376 The discrepant
treatment of welfare applicants and discount recipient suggests that the answer
is the cost of the home in which the drawers are located.
V. SOLUTIONS
Section 2704, and the whole Chapter 14 of which it is a part, was drafted
to allow for the reality of intrafamily transactions, specifically, to prevent
outcomes like the one in the 1987 case of Estate of Harrison.377 In Harrison, six
months before the decedent died, his sons transferred his assets to a partnership
in exchange for 1% general partnership interest and a 77.8% limited partnership
interest.378 The sons each also received a general partnership interest.379 The
general partnership interests included the right to force the liquidation of the
partnership, while the limited partnership interest did not.380 This right was
obviously valuable because it allowed the holder to turn his interest into cash at
any time.381 The right of the general partnership holder to force liquidation
lapsed at that holder’s death.382
The dispute in the case was about the general partnership interest that the
decedent held.383 Because the valuable liquidation right had lapsed at death, the
estate argued that the value of the interest was significantly lower than it had
been before his death.384 The IRS urged the court to overlook the technicalities
of the partnership agreement in favor of the reality that the decedent’s interest
passed to his sons, who were general partners themselves and could exercise the
same liquidation right that had lapsed with decedent’s death.385 But the court
was counterfactual386 instead:

376. See Budd, supra note 364, at 403 & n.401 (citing Recent Case, Constitutional Law — Fourth
Amendment — Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning Receipt of Welfare Benefits on Consent to Suspicionless
Home Visits. — Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006)., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1996
(2007)).
377. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987).
378. Id. at 1307.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. “Counterfactual thinking” refers to the human tendency to create possible alternatives to real
life events that have already occurred and that are contrary to what actually happened. See generally
Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking, 121 PSYCH. BULL. 133 (1997) (discussing how counterfactual
thinking relies on mental depictions of alternatives to past events).
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To find the fair market value of a property interest at the decedent’s
death we put ourselves in the position of a potential purchaser of the
interest at that time. Such a person would not be influenced in his
calculation by past risks that had failed to materialize or by restrictions
that had ended. Death tolls the bell for risks, contingencies, or
restrictions which exist only during the life of the decedent. A potential
buyer focuses on the value the property has in the present or will have
in the future. He attributes full value to any right that vests or matures
at death, and he reduces his valuation to account for any risk or
deprivation that death brings into effect . . . .387
The problem with this thinking, of course, is that there was no “potential
purchaser” in the sense the court intended. There were only the sons, who
inherited the limited shares, making them immediately subject to their rights
as general partners to liquidation. Sections of Chapter 14 tried to address this
type of intrafamily transfer by treating liquidation (and other rights) that lapsed
upon a transferor’s death as gifts or as part of the decedent’s gross estate if “the
individual holding such right immediately before the lapse and members of such
individual’s family hold, both before and after the lapse, control of the
entity.”388 Section 2704 also provides that restrictions on liquidation will be
disregarded—that is, not allowed to deflate value for tax purposes—if “the
transferor and members of the transferor’s family hold, immediately before the
transfer, control of the entity.”389 Restrictions covered by the statute exclude
“any restriction imposed, or required to be imposed, by any Federal or State
law.”390
By 2016, however, the IRS had concluded that, over the years, various
changes in state laws and other subsequent developments had “rendered
[§ 2704] substantially ineffective in implementing the purpose and intent of the
statute.”391 First, courts had ruled that under the current regulations, § 2704(b)
applied only to restrictions on the ability to liquidate an entire entity, and not
to restrictions on the ability to liquidate the transferred interest in that entity.392
Second, many states helpfully passed more restrictive partnership laws, thus
allowing most restrictions in partnership agreements to fall under the exclusion
for any “restriction imposed, or required to be imposed, by any Federal or State

387. Est. of Harrison, 52 T.C.M. at 1308.
388. 26 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1)(B).
389. Id. § 2704(b)(1)(B).
390. Id. § 2704(3)(B).
391. Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes; Restriction on Liquidation of an
Interest, 81 Fed. Reg. 51,413 (proposed Aug. 4, 2016) (withdrawn on Oct. 20, 2017).
392. Kerr v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 449, 473 (1999), aff’d, 292 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2002).
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law.”393 Finally, people avoided the application of the section by transferring
interests to assignees or nonfamily members.394
The IRS drafted the 2016 proposed regulations to address these attempts
to chip away at the effectiveness of the statute. The proposed regulations clarify
that they apply to restrictions on the liquidation of transferred parts of the
entity, not just the entity as a whole.395 The IRS removed the loophole for
restrictions imposed by state law and limited the ability of an assignee or a
nonfamily member to cause the entity to escape the family control definition.396
In essence, the proposed regulations reimpose family attribution rules to
covered entities, acknowledge that families work together to manage assets, and
recognize that the lapse of a liquidation right means something different when
the interest passes to a family member than when it passes to a stranger.
Predictably, these regulations elicited much wailing and gnashing of teeth
from tax lawyers, CPAs, estate planners, financial advisors, and family business
owners397 Much of this took place at the hearings on the proposed regulations,
held on December 1, 2016, where family businesspeople gloomily predicted that
the imposition of the family attribution rules would force their heirs to sell these
“legacy businesses” or ranch lands to pay the taxes.398 The Treasury withdrew
the proposal in early days of the Trump administration.399
This withdrawal was unfortunate. The proposed regulations would have
eliminated a large tax expenditure that is based on a legal fiction. As one of its
few supporters at the hearing pointed out, the change would affect only a very
small percentage of estates, even at the 2016 estate tax exemption rates of $5.45
million, or $10.9 million for married couples.400 The exemption rate now is over
$15 million, and, whatever happens to it under future administrations, it is
unlikely to return to anything below the 2016 level.
393. Id. at 462.
394. Id. at 468.
395. See § 2704.
396. See id.
397. See, e.g., Kevin Robertson, Proposed Regulations Under IRC Section 2704 Seek To Eliminate
Discounts on Transfers of Family Business Interests, BAKER HOSTETLER: WEALTH DIR. BLOG (Sept. 23,
2016), https://www.wealthdirector.com/2016/09/proposed-regulations-under-irc-section-2704-seek-to
-eliminate-discounts-on-transfers-of-family-business-interests/ [https://perma.cc/D299-S57F].
398. Public Hearing on Proposed Regulations: Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes;
Restrictions on Liquidation of an Interest Before the IRS (2016) (statement of Clarene Law), https://www.
nmmlaw.com/pdf/IRS%20Public%20Hearing%20on%20Proposed%20Regulations.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4E9R-VUQL].
399. STEVEN T. MNUCHIN, SECOND REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON IDENTIFYING AND
REDUCING TAX REGULATORY BURDENS 2–3 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/2018-03004_Tax_EO_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3W7-6HJP].
400. Public Hearing on Proposed Regulations: Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes;
Restrictions on Liquidation of an Interest Before the IRS (2016) (statement of Dawn Jinsky), https://www.
nmmlaw.com/pdf/IRS%20Public%20Hearing%20on%20Proposed%20Regulations.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4E9R-VUQL].
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These proposals take a promising step, but the abuse of valuation discounts
requires more broad-based reform. We need to acknowledge that family factfinding is as appropriate at one end of the wealth spectrum as it is at the other.
A family seeking government benefits in the form of reduced taxes through
drastic discounts in the valuation of family-held assets should reasonably expect
to support its claim with evidence of the family’s discord and inability to
cooperate in managing assets. Evidence of family cooperation, in the form of
the use of wealth preservation strategies or something else, would support the
presumption of family unity. Evidence of family disunity could rebut the
presumption. If the case histories recounted here are anything to go by, family
antagonism is not hard to spot.
The regime I propose does not create perverse incentives, as some might
argue. A family can accrue much more wealth by cooperating in maximizing
assets than it can by intentionally ignoring best practices to gain tax discounts.
Under the current rules, the incentive is to do both. Since the discounts are
automatic, the family can cooperate to maximize asset growth while avoiding
taxes at the same time with a legal fiction of lost value. Faced with a real choice,
no family would choose to destroy a dollar’s worth of value for forty cents worth
of tax savings.
As a matter of political and administrative practicality, I propose that the
new rules should include a safe harbor. Minority shares in passive assets in an
FLP will automatically receive a 10% discount; those in an active business will
receive a 15% discount. This difference reflects the different nature of the two
kinds of assets, and the greater number of avenues for freezing or squeezing a
shareholder out in a going concern. A family seeking a deeper discount would
need to show clear and convincing evidence that a minority shareholder would
suffer harm at the hands of a controlling shareholder
This regime would, I suggest, create powerful incentives, because there are
positive effects on both sides. While the 10–15% discount is lower than the
average one granted by courts, the safe harbor aspect would make it a tempting
alternative to litigation. In the case of the FLP holding passive assets, a family
that chose to argue for a higher percentage would be forced, in the case of the
FLP holding passive assets, to admit to a breach of its duty toward the
beneficiaries of those assets. A family running an FLP business would, likewise,
have to acknowledge internal strife and the likelihood that some family
members were likely to be squeezed out. Neither of these are an appealing
litigation strategy. Such risks would likely only be worthwhile in extreme cases.
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Safe harbors appear regularly in the Tax Code.401 They exist to “protect[]
taxpayers from the vast unknown of facts and circumstances tests.”402 The
usually function in the following way:
[A] safe harbor accompanies such a facts and circumstances test. If a
taxpayer satisfies the safe harbor’s clearly defined criteria, the taxpayer
will receive specific, generally favorable, tax treatment and need not
evaluate how he or she would fare under the facts and circumstances test.
If a taxpayer operates outside the boundaries of a safe harbor, he or she
will not automatically forfeit the tax treatment accorded to taxpayers
falling within the safe harbor. Rather, an underlying standard will
determine the tax consequences imposed upon taxpayers who function
beyond the limits of a safe harbor, and, under this standard, some
taxpayers will receive the same treatment provided to taxpayers within
the safe harbor while some will not.403
The standard that lies outside the safe harbor is that valuation discounts
will only be granted if there is clear and convincing evidence of family strife or
mismanagement of assets to a degree that threatens the fair treatment of
minority shareholders. If a filer declines the safe harbor, what kinds of evidence
would constitute a clear and convincing threat to a minority shareholder’s
security and fair treatment?
To summarize: the existing regime fails to value accurately transferred
shares in family businesses for a variety of reasons. The 2016 proposed
regulations tried to address some of those failings, but in addition to being
withdrawn, they ignored the fundamentally flawed premise of the discount
regime—that high-wealth families are all unhappy (and all unhappy in the same
way). My proposal would require proof that a family truly was dysfunctional in
a way that disadvantaged minority shareholders. For political palatability and
efficiency, I offer a safe harbor where families can take a proffered discount
without submitting to fact-finding. This solution injects a dose of reality into
the discount regime and brings it into line with the treatment of people
receiving benefits on the other side of town.

401. Emily Cauble, Safe Harbors in Tax Law, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1385, 1385 (2015) (observing that
“[s]afe harbors pervade tax law”). For safe harbor provisions in other tax code areas, see Tax Court
Approves Reverse Like-Kind Exchange Outside of Safe Harbor, 44 REAL EST. TAX’N 13, 13 (2016); IRS
Provides Optional Safe Harbor Method for Claiming Home-Office Deduction, 118 J. TAX’N 59, 59 (2013);
Safe and Not-So-Safe Harbors, 36 J. CORP. TAX’N 29, 29 (2009) (discussing safe harbors in corporate
tax law); Choosing Interest Rates for Family Transactions To Avoid a Gift as well as Imputed Income, 83 J.
TAX’N 155, 155 (1995); The Impact on Partners of Allocations That Have Substantial Economic Effect, 4 J.
P’SHIP TAX’N 112, 112 (1987).
402. Cauble, supra note 401, at 1391.
403. Id. at 1391–92.
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CONCLUSION
This Article is based on the premise that welfare benefits for the poor are
analogous to tax breaks for the wealthy. Both cost taxpayers money: welfare
benefits are a direct cost, while tax benefits cost taxpayers in unpaid taxes that
they must subsidize. Given this analogy, it is unfair to subject one group of
recipients to surveillance while letting the other group benefit from
assumptions about their families—especially when those assumptions are
questionable at best.
My proposal both levels the field and prevents the group that has escaped
scrutiny from continuing to receive unmerited benefits. Invasion of poor
people’s privacy is too deeply entrenched in our law and political culture to
change, but we can at least treat everyone who receives benefits the same way.
Doing so, moreover, is not just fair, it can bring millions back into the public
fisc for the national benefit.

